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APRIL, 1974

CANADA, 1974

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Current History

APRIL, 1974

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This study of Canada examines the problems facing various regions, relations between Canada and the United States, and Canadian politics and economics. How is Canada developing in the 1970's? Our introductory article concludes: "Canada seems . . . to have come to the end of a long quest . . . for her own identity. . . . Perhaps because Canada did not move to nationhood by revolution but by evolution, there was never a single point in time in which Canadian identity was clearly established. It long bothered Canadians that they were so left in limbo."

Canada in Perspective

BY RICHARD H. LEACH

Professor of Political Science, Duke University

LOOKING AT CANADA at any period of time requires a brief excursion backward into Canadian history. Canada's French origin has served through time to provide her both with a distinctively hybrid culture and with a continuing set of social, economic, and political problems. It is not merely that French influence has such deep roots—all the way back to Jacques Cartier's explorations in 1535 and Samuel de Champlain's establishment of Port Royal and Fort Louis in 1604 and 1608 respectively—but even more important is the fact that the dualism balancing French and English components has been embedded by deed in Canadian life and by word in the British North America Act of 1867, which serves as Canada's federal constitution.

For many years, resentment grew as the late arriving British dominated their French compatriots.¹ Quebec, the seat of French Canadianism, became steadily more self-assertive. World War I saw French Canadians set themselves aside in great numbers to riot in protest to the draft; and the war left deep divisions, which still have not healed. Numbers accentuated the problem: at confederation in 1867 about 61 percent of the Canadian people had British backgrounds; by 1922, that percentage had fallen to 55.4 percent, while the percentage of French-speaking Canadians had reached 27.9 percent of the total pop-

ulation. Since then, the gap between the two groups has narrowed even further, until by now only about 43 percent are of British origin. (It should be noted that even in 1922 some 17 percent of Canadians were neither British nor French in origin and that the percentage has increased considerably since then.)

It has been the French-speaking Canadians who have emphasized distinctions, who have complained of inferior status and who have demanded protective action, and who are responsible for the national tension about minority rights. Any assessment of the present and future of Canada must begin with the French issue. It is largely the province of Quebec and the Québécois who have kept the issue of minority rights active (though all French Canadians are not confined there—there are sizable French blocs in New Brunswick and Manitoba). What seemed in the 1960's to be a mounting drive for the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada may turn out to have been blunted by the October, 1973, provincial election, in which the Parti Québécois won only six out of 110 seats in the provincial legislature, and René Lévesque, the party's dynamic leader, lost his seat altogether. However, the Parti Québécois did poll 31 percent of the vote and became the official opposition party to the victorious Liberals. The party "must now decide whether to soften its approach to separation further, or to make new efforts to educate the voters not to fear it."² In any case, a definitive test of the separatist cause and of the power of the

¹ See the novel by Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes*, first published in 1945 and now available in paperback as No. 1 in the Laurentian Library series of Macmillan of Canada.

² *Economist* (London), November 3, 1973, p. 70.

French-Canadian segment of the population in national affairs is yet to come.

Canada, despite the wishes of some Canadians, cannot be considered apart from her relationship with the United States, now or at any time in the past 200 years. Involved together in the Revolutionary War and in the War of 1812, constantly concerned in the nineteenth century with boundary problems, brought ever closer in the twentieth century by economic ties, the two countries have developed a unique relationship. Indeed, confederation, when it came in Canada in 1867, was perhaps more in reaction to the imagined threat of a victorious North than it was due to the pressure of internal factors. Ever since, as Canada has sought to develop her own nationhood, she has had to do so, both in the eyes of the world and in her own mind, as a virtual adjunct to her neighbor to the South. Much that is truly Canadian is overlooked because of the overwhelming presence of the United States in Canadian affairs.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

There are presently impelling reasons to discuss Canadian-American relations. As the head of the *Wall Street Journal's* Ottawa bureau, John E. Cooney, reported in November, 1973, "After years of complaining [about the relationship], Canada is finally striking out on its own . . . a 'Canadianization' process [is] taking place there, an attempt to put some distance between Canada and its powerful neighbor. . . ."³ She is doing so by striving to become more independent of the United States, which, translated, means that she will henceforth not be so likely to do what America bids, or, more correctly, what Canada feels the United States wants, as she used to be. "The most obvious example in recent days . . . is Canada's crude oil export tax . . . [that] tax and the following increase were initiated without consultation with Washington. . . ."⁴ One other example of her newly declared freedom is passage in November of the bill requiring government screening of take-overs of Canadian companies with assets of \$250,000 or more or annual sales of over \$3 million, as well as of all new investments by foreign interests. While the act is cast in general terms, it has most direct application to the United States, and both Canada and the United States know it.

It is not only in the economic sphere that Canada

³ *Wall Street Journal*, November 23, 1973, p. 6. Mr. Cooney entitles his article, "A Cold Wind from the North."

⁴ *Wall Street Journal*, November 23, 1973, p. 6.

⁵ See a summary of a speech by Fulford in *Canada Today/D'Aujourd'hui*, vol. 4, no. 7, September, 1973, p. 1.

⁶ The entire communiqué is given in *Canada Weekly*, vol. 1, no. 49, December 12, 1973. *Canada Weekly* is a publication of the Information Division, Canadian Department of External Affairs.

is attempting to disassociate herself from the United States. Robert Fulford, editor of the Canadian magazine *Saturday Night*, points out that Canada has long been a cultural suburb of the United States. "What if," he asks, "a society looks into the mirror" provided by its fine arts and its mass media "and never sees itself?" Fortunately for Canada, Fulford sees Canadian culture now "turning inward, [taking on] a fresh concern with local issues and feelings" instead of reflecting foreign—mostly American—images.⁵

In short, a new "Canada First" policy may be developing, a development the United States, too long seeming to take Canada for granted, will have to watch and react to carefully. In recognition of what is happening, the United States created in October, 1972, for the first time in history, the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian Affairs. Until then, Canada had been handled along with European affairs.

Of about equal concern to Canada as her relationship with the United States is her relationship with Russia, with whom she also shares a common border. Recently that concern has been manifested by an increase in contact between the two nations. Thus the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, at the invitation of the Soviet government, visited the U.S.S.R. for a week in November, 1973, following up on Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's 1971 visit. At the end of Sharp's visit, a joint communiqué was issued stressing the "atmosphere of frankness, cordiality and mutual understanding" in which the discussions took place and noting "with satisfaction the steady expansion of Canada-Soviet relations in recent years." Emphasized were "the agreements and arrangements concluded in 1971 plac[ing] relations between Canada and the U.S.S.R. on the foundation of . . . peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation."⁶ The construction of a superstructure on that foundation may well alter in turn Canada's relations with the United States.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

This is a propitious time to look anew at Canada, not only because of still unsettled issues raised by the French minority and of the nationalism that is stirring there, but also because politically Canada is a question mark. In part the question arises out of the 1972 national election, the closest in national history, when Prime Minister Trudeau's Liberal party won only 109 seats in the Canadian House of Commons (the effective governing body of Canada) to 107 for Robert Stanfield's Progressive Conservative party, 30 for David Lewis's New Democratic party (NDP), 15 for the Social Credit party, and two for Independents, making the Trudeau government emphatically a minority government able to govern only in coalition. Indeed, Trudeau is only able to stay in office because

the New Democrats have so far gone along with the Liberals to form a majority. Seldom has "the nightmare" of the parliamentary form of government, where a third party, "with barely 18 percent of the popular vote, [holds] the balance of power in Commons and . . . possess[es] bargaining power on issues out of all proportion to its popular support," been so starkly revealed.⁷ The extent of the New Democrats' power was clearly revealed early in December when Prime Minister Trudeau incorporated into his energy policy speech several of the New Democrats' demands. "Mr. Trudeau has accepted our demands," David Lewis, NDP leader, declared. "It is a total victory for New Democratic policies."⁸ How long the New Democrats will accept Liberal actions—and how far Trudeau and his party will have to bend to continue to receive its support—remains to be seen. The Trudeau regime has come in for a good deal of criticism on a number of grounds, and a changeover to Stanfield and the Conservatives might introduce a large number of policy changes.

But Canadian politics is unstable just now for other reasons as well. Quebec is not a secure member of the Canadian political family, and there is unhappiness and unrest in both Atlantic Canada (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland)—the poorest part of the country—and Western Canada (British Columbia, almost a case by itself, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba), which is feeling independent for the opposite reason—its newfound prosperity. Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces are chronic problems; regionalism in the West, although rooted in the past, has only begun to be worrisome. Because of its throbbing economy, the national government is increasingly concerned just now about the West's unhappiness. The West's complaints

center on issues like the domination of Western economies by huge national banks based in Montreal and Toronto and discriminatory freight rates, which were established years ago when the West was being [exploited to provide raw] materials for the industrial East. . . . The Western complaint also includes the often unspoken feeling that the French-Canadians are gaining too much ground. There is particular resentment about Prime Minister Trudeau's Official Languages Act. . . . "It's out-and-out silly to have 'bureau de poste' written on the post office here,"

protests a rancher in Calgary, where French is the native language of 1.3 per cent of the population.⁹

It is true that Ontario and Quebec produce about 80 percent of the country's manufactures and have by far the largest share of secondary industry. It is also a fact that the four Western provincial governments are all run by parties in opposition to the government in Ottawa. The aim of the West does not yet seem to be separation but to bring an end to what it sees as "Ottawa's historic policy of 'preserving the West as a colony of central Canada.'"¹⁰ By July, 1973, Prime Minister Trudeau had "acknowledged that Western alienation was 'a much more difficult problem than the alienation from the federal system that Quebec felt a decade ago'"¹¹ and the question began to be asked, "Can the West Be Won Again?"¹² During the 1970's, especially with the rapidly rising importance of oil from Western fields, that question may become the central one for Canada to answer.

THE FAR NORTH

But if some of Canada's regions are worry spots as she looks to the future, her Far North offers Canada an opportunity for future growth and development shared among the nations of the world only with Soviet Russia. The Canadian Far North has remained largely uninhabited and remote from the core of national life. It will not always remain so, for it contains potentially rich—their exact importance is in doubt pending further exploration—deposits of gold, nickel, silver, lead, zinc, iron ore, and natural gas. So far, what exploration and exploitation has been done there has been done by private companies. Should the national and provincial governments put Northern development high on their lists of priorities, Canada's economic position in the world—and her relationship at least with the United States as well—would likely undergo drastic change. Late in 1972, a plan was announced by the national government to meet transportation requirements in the North over a 10-year period. New transport commitments are essential. Canadian Transport Minister Jean Marchand declared, "in order to open up resource development and later to sustain growth" in that area of the country.¹³ The next few years should see the gradual unfolding of that plan.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

Even without enjoying the full contribution of her vast Northern territories, Canada is already a rich nation, with a standard of living second only to that of the United States. Her gross national product in 1973 was up seven percent over her 1972 GNP, and her expectations are for continuing growth. As are most advanced countries today, however, Canada is plagued by inflation and rising food costs and troubled by the worldwide energy crisis. She also has her

⁷ *The New York Times*, November 1, 1972, p. 44.

⁸ *The New York Times*, December 12, 1973, p. 16.

⁹ William Borders, in *The New York Times*, November 27, 1973, p. 2. The title of Borders' article is "Western Canada Feels East Just Doesn't Understand."

¹⁰ *Economist* (London), July 28, 1973, p. 32.

¹¹ *Economist* (London), July 28, 1973, p. 32.

¹² *Economist* (London), July 28, 1973, p. 32. See also article by John E. Cooney, "Trudeau's Big Showdown in Calgary," *Wall Street Journal*, July 25, 1973, p. 12.

¹³ *Canada Weekly*, vol. 1, no. 3, January 24, 1973, p. 7.

share of labor problems. As in most developed countries, the agricultural sector is declining and the industrial work force increasing. A particularly difficult problem for Canada in the mid-1970's is how to raise family incomes in agriculture to the level of non-farm family incomes, on the one hand, and how to attain a better distribution of income within the agricultural sector itself, on the other. Canadian federalism is so structured that agricultural policy making is divided among the provincial and the national governments, with the result that there is not one but many agricultural policies. To date, these policies have not been brought together sufficiently to cope with the problem.¹⁴

Another economic problem in Canada is finding the additional capital investment needed to provide enough jobs for everyone in industry. The unemployment rate rose in 1973 to about six percent. Thus of great concern to Canada as to every major nation in the mid-1970's is how best to achieve sustained economic growth. One way that Canada is working on her economic problems is through seeking broader trade contacts around the world. A Canadian mission studied the trade opportunities in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji in October, 1973; a series of conferences to promote trade with Latin America were held across Canada in 1973; and the same year Prime Minister Trudeau signed a three-year trade agreement with China's Premier Chou En-lai. She is also seeking to broaden the base of her trade with East European countries through discussions and revisions of existing trade agreements. All this is part of Canada's determined internationalism. As Robert Fulford remarked, the postwar generations "of Canadians grew up addicted to the idea of internationalism. We learned to cherish what we thought of as Canada's special role in international affairs . . ."¹⁵ a role characterized by her continuing attempts to develop closer ties with the European Economic Community, her willing participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities in the Far and Middle East, and by her recent assertion of leadership in the Commonwealth.¹⁶ Through all these thrusts, Canada has

¹⁴ See Robert W. Crown and Earl O. Header, *Policy Integration in Canadian Agriculture* (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 1972).

¹⁵ See footnote 5.

¹⁶ Richard H. Leach, "Canada and the Commonwealth," *International Perspectives*, May/June, 1973, pp. 24-29.

¹⁷ Richard H. Leach, ed., *Contemporary Canada* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 308-311.

¹⁸ *Canada Weekly*, vol. 1, no. 13, April 4, 1973, p. 3.

¹⁹ From the statement to the First Committee of the Twenty-eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by W. H. Barton, Canadian Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, October 24, 1973, given in *Statements and Speeches*, no. 73/22, a publication of the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

become "a major force in the world for peace, and her commitment can be counted on to lead her into a still more active role in the years ahead."¹⁷

Canada has made a generous commitment (three cents of every tax dollar in 1973) to aid the underdeveloped countries of the world. In 1970 the Canadian Parliament created the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), designed to support research adapting science and technology to the specific needs of the developing regions, as determined by the underdeveloped countries themselves. Six persons from developing countries served on IDRC's first board (1970-1972). In creating IDRC, Canada acted on the conviction that "the gap between the low-income nations and the wealthier nations of the world was to a large extent a science and technology gap, and that virtually all the world's expenditure on research and development was occurring in the industrialized countries and chiefly for their benefit."¹⁸ In the two and one-half years of IDRC operation ending April, 1973, some 99 projects, involving grants of \$13.4 million in Canadian funds, had been approved for support. Projects chiefly involved agriculture and forestry in the semi-arid tropical countries and population studies, rural health care, and the development of the social and information sciences elsewhere. Nearly all the research is being carried out in developing countries and by research workers of those regions.

Nor is this Canada's only contribution to the developing countries. She also makes a large number of grants of money and/or services to individual developing countries and makes a significant contribution to the United Nations Development Program. In fact, in November, 1973, she announced that she had increased the latter by \$1.9 million, bringing her 1973 contribution to \$21.7 million. In 1974, she will maintain that amount and add a supplementary sum of \$500,000 to be devoted to projects designed to accelerate development in the least-developed countries, bringing her total 1974 contribution to \$22.2 million.

Canada is accepting the responsibilities of a mature nation, by so doing promoting "constructive and stable relations between states" and hopefully making the threat of war less and less "a credible tool in the hands of the governments."¹⁹

SOCIAL ADVANCEMENTS

Canada is moving ahead in a great many areas. Canadian health services are recognized as among the most advanced in the world. By agreements between the federal and provincial governments, under the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, all provinces and territories make available, on a prepayment or tax-financed basis, to all covered residents, standard ward accommodation and the services ordinarily supplied by a hospital to in-patients. These include meals, nursing care, laboratory, radiological

and other diagnostic procedures, and most drugs. In addition to hospital care, a number of other medical services are provided under a variety of prepaid arrangements, including medical care insurance for physicians' services, health care programs for welfare recipients, and rehabilitation services.

Since the early 1950's, Canada has established a virile theater, both live and televised. Since then, a full account would have to include the evolution of a distinct French-Canadian theater, a number of important summer drama festivals, the rise of the National Theatre and the National Ballet Schools, and the emergence of the English-speaking "separate" stage. It should also include reference to the development of a nationwide chain of professional theater organizations, the emphasis on productions and performances for young people, and the search of the Dominion Drama Festival to find new ways to contribute to the further development of the theater in Canada.

It is not only in the theater that Canada has taken giant steps. The quarter century from 1945 to 1970 has similarly seen "radical changes in the state of art and the artist" in Canada. Before World War II, Canada was "an artistic backwater." For the most part, "Canadian artists were no more than competent provincials working in various academic traditions that were already at least 30 years out of date."²⁰ By the early 1970's all that had changed. The names of such nonfigurative Canadian artists as Jean-Paul Riopelle and William Roland, Jack Shadbolt and Paul-Emile Bordnar, and Jack Bush had achieved worldwide recognition. Moreover, "work by living Canadian artists not only [appeared] in galleries and in the . . . annual . . . shows but in such unlikely public places as dealers' show windows, airports, corporate foyers, city halls, and the sides of buildings in downtown Toronto." In short, Canadian art has come of age.²¹

Aiding in the process has been the Canada Council's Art Bank, which by early 1973 had purchased 1,128 works from 194 Canadian artists, both to help professional artists and to give the public a chance to see contemporary Canadian art.*

Similarly in architecture, a distinctive Canadian brand has recently developed. "Before 1960, Canadian architecture was practical but not original. Visitors found that home-inspired contributions were

severely limited."²² That is no longer true. Montreal's Place Bonaventure and Moshe Safdie's Habitat at EXPO '67, Toronto's new City Hall, the rebuilding of the University of Alberta campus at Edmonton, and the new Simon Fraser University campus on Burnaby Mountain near Vancouver are only a few examples of what has come to be seen as the development of "a characteristically Canadian involvement with context."²³

What deserves comment finally is that Canada seems at last to have come to the end of a long quest, a quest for her own identity. Somehow, Americans seemed to know who they were from the outset. They set themselves apart from others by their own actions and in their own minds, and others accepted them as distinctive, without argument. Not so the Canadians. Perhaps because Canada did not move to nationhood by revolution but by evolution, there was never a single point in time in which Canadian identity was clearly established. It long bothered Canadians that they were left so in limbo. As Prime Minister Trudeau said to the nation, July 1, 1973, "There have been times in past years when Canadians conducted an anxious search for national identity." By the early 1970's, however, the Prime Minister went on, the search had been called off, for by then, Canada's life as a nation had come to be seen as sufficient to make clear to Canadians themselves and to the world at large what is peculiarly Canadian and what distinguishes them from others.

In the Prime Minister's words, what sets Canada apart is the development and pridful maintenance of a "value system which places first priorities on the quality of life for each individual person in [Canadian] society, and . . . cherishes each person's uniqueness. [The Canadian] system does not impose . . . slogans or images of what Canadians are supposed to believe in. Rather it encourages each [Canadian] to develop to [his] fullest potential and asks that, as [they] share a common citizenship, [they] respect each other's differences."²⁴ Tolerance and concern for others is no mean national commitment, a commitment Canada seems uniquely qualified to meet as she faces the last quarter of the twentieth century, and a goal other nations in the world would do well to adopt.

Richard H. Leach is a member of the Commonwealth Studies Group at Duke University. Among other books, he is the author of *Interstate Relations in Australia* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1965), *Contemporary Canada* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1968), *American Federalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970) and with A. T. Mason, *In Quest of Freedom* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1959). In 1975, he will become a Senior Scholar at Australian National University.

* The Canada Council is an agency of the government created to promote the arts.

²⁰ William Withrow, introduction to *Contemporary Canadian Painting* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Canada Today/D'Aujourd'hui*, vol. 4, no. 2, February, 1973, p. 2.

²³ *Loc. cit.*

²⁴ The Prime Minister's message is given in full in *Canada Weekly*, vol. 1, no. 27, July 11, 1973, p. 5.

"Today, . . . all Canada is uniting in a crescendo of confidence to preserve the Canadian heritage and to defend Canada against the . . . [neighbor] whose presence has brought Canada together, fostered her national pride, and provided the impetus for the new surge of nationalism."

The Surge of Nationalism in Canada Today

By KENNETH M. GLAZIER
Chief Librarian, University of Calgary, Alberta

VISITORS TO CANADA are sometimes startled by what seems to them "anti-Americanism—critical comments about United States control of oil and gas companies, about the large number of United States professors in the universities, or about the flood of United States magazines on the newsstands. To the casual observer such talk does sound like anti-Americanism, but to anyone familiar with the Canadian scene it is not so much anti-Americanism as pro-Canadianism, a sudden surge of Canadian nationalism. The outlook of Canadians has changed: they have a new sense of identity and national pride, a new urge to control their own resources and industries, a new determination to make use of their own talent and to preserve their cultural heritage. The dominant theme in Canada today is nationalism.

Nationalism in Canada is different from that in the United States, where it is grounded upon history—the American Revolution, and the memory of heroes such as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. In Canada nationalism is not based on the past but on the future. Canadians do not point to any single event in history nor to any particular founding fathers. Canada is concentrating not on what has been but on what will be when she becomes master of her own destiny.

The dramatic change in Canadian thinking began after World War II when Canada saw the gradual decline of the British empire. She saw Britain moving closer to the European Economic Community and knew that the old days of preferential trade with Britain and the empire were over. When she saw the United States emerge as the strongest free world nation, a great industrial giant casting a mighty shadow over struggling new Canadian industries, she suddenly began to look at her own potential and to adopt a more independent stand. Nor did Canada want to

be identified with the United States in the Vietnam War. As one prominent Canadian said:

It's one of the more curious ironies of our history that it was the Vietnamization of the United States that finally brought about the Canadianization of Canada. It jolted us out of our bemusement with the external aspects of the American Dream.¹

As Canada looked at her resources and her industrial capacity, she began to develop new confidence. Canadians, who had always been considered rather unemotional, became enthusiastic about their country and proud to be called Canadians. By 1967—the 100th anniversary of confederation—they had their own flag and began to wave it at home and wear it in their lapels when they went abroad. In that year, their pride was symbolized by EXPO in Montreal, where Americans discovered the new Canada—and Canadians discovered themselves. Soon afterward a publication called *One Thousand and One Reasons for Being Proud to be a Canadian*, listing the achievements of Canadians, had a wide distribution. And today, with Canada the only industrialized nation in the Western world that produces more oil than it consumes, Canadians have come to realize that they live in a favored land.

Recently, the new nationalism has found expression in groups such as the Committee for an Independent Canada (CIC), with headquarters in Toronto and about 40 branches across the land. The remarkable thing about the group is not its numerical strength—probably only 150,000 members—but the caliber of some of the people who have given it their support: Peter C. Newman, editor of Canada's national magazine, *MacLean's*; Pierre Berton, whose books on the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway are really the story of the birthpangs of a nation; and Walter Gordon, former Minister of Finance. Other well-known protagonists of nationalism are Donald Creigh-

¹ Peter C. Newman, *MacLean's*, November, 1972, p. 25.

ton, distinguished Canadian historian, and Hugh MacLennan, professor of English at McGill University and author of *Two Solitudes*, the classic story of the French-English confrontation in Quebec. Thus the nationalist movement is not a response to student radicals or to the angry young men or to the dispossessed. It is the stand of the intellectual, the successful, the articulate, the influential; and gradually their voice is being heard in the land, and their views are becoming actions in the board rooms of business, in the academic councils of universities, in the Cabinet rooms of provincial legislatures, and in the legislative committee rooms of the House of Commons. Nationalism today is no longer a theory but an action and often a statute.

NATIONALISM MANIFEST

The first expression of nationalism is Canada's attempt to gain control over her own natural resources—gas, oil, minerals—many of which have been, and in many instances still are, under United States corporate control.

It is calculated that 83 percent of the oil companies in Canada are United States-financed, and Canada fully recognizes her indebtedness to the enormous amounts of risk capital the United States has been willing to expend to make the oil and gas discoveries. But the energy crisis has made Canada take a new look at where her natural resources are going. In 1973, Canadians were chagrinned to discover that while Canada was shipping one million barrels of oil a day to the United States, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces had to depend on supplies from Venezuela and the Middle East because the main oil and gas pipeline from the West ends at Sarnia, Ontario. It is true that extending the pipeline further east had often been talked about, but Quebec had preferred to purchase cheaper oil from Venezuela than to pay higher prices to Western Canada. Today the government of Canada has sanctioned, and will support, the extension of the pipeline from Ontario to Montreal, to be completed by 1975. And in time the Maritimes and hence all of Canada will be supplied with Canadian gas and oil, so that Canadians east of Toronto will no longer be dependent on the vagaries of Venezuela or the maneuvers in the Middle East. Just as in 1885 Canada was at last bound together by two ribbons of steel—the Canadian Pacific Railway—so by 1975 or shortly thereafter Canada will be bound together by another band of steel—a pipeline bringing Canadian gas and oil to the entire nation.

Steps have been taken by the Canadian government to ensure Canadian participation in any development of Canadian resources. For example, legislation was enacted in 1970 to prevent the control of Denison Mines, Canada's major source of uranium ore, from falling under United States control. And to ensure

that Canadians will share in the management and profits of the extensive oil and gas deposits in the Arctic area, Panarctic was formed. It is a conglomerate of United States oil firms that will work along with the Canadian government in making Arctic exploration. And on a still wider scale, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons on December 6, 1973, announced the formation of the National Petroleum Corporation to carry on exploration and development in frontier areas, including the Athabasca oil sands. Already the government has given Syncrude Canada Ltd. sanction to build a \$1-billion complex for the development of the oil sands, with the Province of Alberta participating in the venture.

He also announced that the government will support and expedite the building of the MacKenzie Valley gas pipeline, a project costing \$5.5 billion, to achieve long-term energy self-sufficiency for Canada and to give assistance to the United States. To make the pipeline a fact, both countries will need to cooperate in transporting Alaska's vast Prudhoe Bay gas reserves through the line to the United States markets and transporting Canadian Arctic reserves to Canadian markets. To promote the pipeline, an international consortium of 28 companies has formed the Canadian Arctic Gas Study Group Ltd., with a Canadian as chairman.

The United States, and particularly Wall Street, was surprised at the strength of Canada's nationalism when, in July, 1973, the Canada Development Corporation (CDC), a Canadian government agency, wanted to purchase, at \$29 a share, 10 million shares of Texasgulf Corporation, a United States firm with considerable holdings in lead-zinc in the rich Kidd Creek area near Timmins, Ontario, and in the sulphur from natural gas in Alberta. Texasgulf fought the takeover in the courts, arguing that such a takeover violated United States anti-trust law and was injurious to the national interest. To Canadians, this was ironic because so many Canadian companies are controlled by United States interests, and Canada was trying to gain a 30-percent control of a United States corporation only because so much of its profits come from Canada. Fortunately, the United States courts ruled in favor of the CDC, thus allowing Canadians to have a larger share in Texasgulf's development of their own resources.

Canadians are concerned not only about the use of oil, gas, and minerals but also about the control and use of their land. All across Canada, Americans have been seeking a "quiet place away from it all" and have been buying up the country's shoreline and farmlands and forests. Prince Edward Island has finally put on the statute books a law that many other provinces have considered: as of May, 1972, any sale to a non-resident of land of more than 10 acres or more

than 330 feet of shoreline must be approved by the Cabinet.

In all the emphasis on nationalism, however, Canada recognizes that she depends on consultation and cooperation with the United States, which often supplies the financial support and the market to make projects viable. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau concluded his December 6 oil policy speech by saying:

I should like to reassure the government and people of the United States that, while we must move toward security of supply and a capacity for self-sufficiency, we will not do so in a manner which is destructive of the beneficial ties which have developed between our two countries. Obviously, the first duty of any Canadian government must be towards its own people. But we will wish to consult with the United States, and we will plan the development of our oil resources in such a way as to continue to export for some years yet.²

Thus the energy crisis has been the impetus toward new cooperation between Canada and the United States, with Canada playing her full role as partner.

Perhaps more than anyone else, Prime Minister Trudeau embodies and supports the new nationalism through his firm stand on Canada's economic rights. Even his world view, as evidenced by his firm stand on the recognition of China, leading eventually to China's entrance to the United Nations, has helped Canada stand strong as an independent nation.

The second expression of Canadian nationalism is the attempt to gain more control over industry. Just as Canadians are gaining control of their natural resources, so they want to gain control of their manufacturing and industrial processes. In no other industrial nation in the world is so much of the economy under foreign control. The United States, for example, has at present a direct investment of \$11.5 billion in manufacturing in Canada.³

On a per capita basis, however, Canadians have invested more in the United States than Americans on a per capita basis have invested in Canada. In the past, Canadians have been inclined to invest in gilt-edged United States securities while letting Americans provide the necessary risk capital for Canadian enterprises.⁴ Happily this tendency is changing. Canadians are now more willing to invest in Canadian ventures, and hence some Canadian companies are now controlled by Canadian rather than United States shareholders. The majority of shares of Canadian Pacific Railway, for example, used to be owned by United States or British citizens, but in the last few

years Canadians have become majority shareholders. Another company that started out as largely United States-owned and is now 95 percent Canadian-owned is Trans-Canada Pipelines. It is a company that was given federal aid by an act of Parliament in 1956, triggering the great pipeline debate about foreign ownership, which some historians consider the beginning of the new nationalism.

The government gives citizens an incentive to invest in Canada by offering a lower income tax on dividends from Canadian stocks. Furthermore, Canadian pension funds are required to invest a certain percentage of their assets in Canadian securities. And, finally, the government invests in Canadian ventures through Canadian Development Corporation. Thus Canadians are increasingly putting more and more of their money into their own country.

In December, 1973, the House of Commons passed the Foreign Investment Review Act, which establishes a screening agency for some foreign investments and restricts the expansion of foreign-controlled firms. The bill, which had been debated off and on for nearly a year, passed on a voice vote without a single dissent and is the first comprehensive federal investment control law. Although it is a moderate approach, still leaving much foreign investment untouched, yet it is a step forward. It gives the Cabinet effective veto power over foreign companies intending to take over Canadian firms valued at more than \$250,000 or doing more than \$3,000,000 a year in business. A would-be buyer will have to submit plans that will be screened by the Foreign Investment Review Agency.

The final decision, left to the Cabinet, will allow a foreign investor to move in only if the sale is of "significant benefit to Canada." Such a benefit might be a willingness of the investor to locate a research and development center in Canada or to expand operations in an area of high unemployment. Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, comments: "We must control our own future. Now we're going to be more than a mere appendage of foreign corporate giants, south of the border."

Action is being taken, not only at the federal level but also at the provincial level as in Ontario, where Premier William Davis has enacted legislation requiring 51 percent of the directors of any provincially chartered company to be Canadian.

A third expression of Canadian nationalism is the attempt of Canadians to develop their human resources and to preserve their cultural heritage.

Canadians are concerned, for example, about the large percentage of non-Canadian professors on the faculties of their universities, particularly in Western Canada. The latest figures (1971-1972) released by Statistics Canada show that the universities in

² Canadian Parliament, House of Commons. Debates. 29th Parliament, 1st session, vol. 117, no. 186, p. 8483.

³ U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, September, 1973, p. 25.

⁴ Kenneth M. Glazier, "Canada's Economic 'Invasion' of the U.S.," *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 1971, p. 14.

the four Western provinces have on their full-time staffs 55.7 percent Canadians, 21.3 percent Americans, and 12.3 percent British citizens.⁵ The reason for the large number of United States and British professors in Canadian universities is that after the war many new universities were established. Instant universities required instant faculty, and the new universities, struggling for reputation, offered excellent salaries and even a two-year tax exemption to attract qualified professors from prestigious United States and British institutions.

Canadians are grateful for the help that these American and British professors have given in establishing new universities, but today the mood has changed. The tax exemption is gone, and there has been a growing emphasis on appointing Canadian graduates. Some progress is being made because in 1971-72, in the 104 degree-granting institutions in all of Canada, 63.3 percent of the teaching staff were Canadians, a slight increase over the 61.4 percent of the previous year.

In one province, Ontario, which has the largest number of universities of any province, a detailed study was made by a committee of the Legislative Assembly to determine the citizenship of faculty and graduate students. It was found that in 1972-73, 64 percent of the faculty were Canadian and 15.5 percent were American. New faculty appointments in that year, however, included a still higher percentage of Americans—17.3 percent.⁶

EMPHASIS ON CANADIANS

The committee has just issued an interim report recommending to the government that each university make a higher percentage of its new appointments from Canadian citizens. If substantial progress is not made in three years, then the committee recommends that for each university in Ontario, averaged over the seven subsequent years, 80 percent of new appointments be Canadian citizens at the time of appointment, and 70 percent be from among those who have obtained most or all of their graduate training at Canadian universities. Further, they recommend that each department in each university be required to report annually on the extent to which courses in the department reflect Canadian facts and problems. And, finally, they recommend that the Ontario Human Rights Code be amended to enable universities to ask for citizenship of applicants for teaching positions, and to permit discrimination in favor of Canadian citizens in faculty appointments to universities in Ontario.⁷ Such far-reaching rec-

ommendations are a patent reflection of the new nationalism.

Since Canadians have come alive concerning the potential of their own country, many Canadians in the United States, particularly in the professional fields, have started to return home. For years, many of the bright young minds went to Ivy League graduate schools in the United States and stayed there. No one paid much attention to this brain drain, but now the Canada Council makes available funds for graduate education abroad, thus encouraging students to return to the country that has supported their studies. Furthermore, as the opportunities for graduate education in Canada improve, particularly with such a facility as the new \$37-million research library at the University of Toronto, graduate research in Canada begins a new era, and more young Canadians will stay in Canada.

The subject matter taught in Canadian schools is receiving as much attention as the faculty. A small but important step toward giving Canadian content to education was taken recently when the Minister of Education of Ontario ruled that, starting in September, 1974, of the 27 credits required for graduation from secondary school, 2 must be in Canadian Studies.

In 1973, the Commission on Canadian Studies was established by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada to report upon teaching and research in the various fields of study relating to Canada. The study includes the number and content of courses offered at the undergraduate and graduate levels, the extent of library holdings relevant to Canadian Studies, the financial support available for such studies, and the personnel available. Serious inadequacies have been found both in the number of courses and the library holdings, but steps are being taken to overcome these deficiencies. In many universities, a department of Canadian Studies has been established, and a concerted effort is being made to secure new Canadian books and periodicals and substantial collections of historic material.

Suddenly, Canadian literature has emerged as worthy of consideration along with British and American literature. Canadian writers—Marshall McLuhan, Northrop Frye, Margaret Laurence, Mordecai Richler, Gabrielle Roy, Morley Callaghan, Hugh MacLennan—are now appearing on the international scene. A recent issue of *The Times Literary Supplement* devoted six articles to Canadian literature, and the author of the leading article writes:

In terms of dynamic activity, excitement, experimentation, even spirit of discovery and chauvinistic pride, Canadian writing is now going through what might best be described as its "Elizabethan" period. Whether or not a Shakespeare or a Ben Jonson will surface from the current whirl of soul-searching and literary outpouring will remain to be seen. Like Stephen Leacock's horseman, the Cana-

⁵ Statistics Canada, *Service Bulletin*, April, 1973, p. 11.

⁶ Ontario: Legislative Assembly, *Interim Report of the Select Committee on Economic and Cultural Nationalism: Colleges and Universities in Ontario*, 1973, pp. 18-19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

dian writer in both English and French seems to be leaping on the horse and riding off in all directions. But one thing is fairly certain—a new concept of Canada and Canadian nationhood is going to emerge.⁸

Canadians are beginning to read about themselves and their country. Most bookstores now have a separate section on Canadian books, with over 2,000 new titles a year; and *Books in Canada*, a booklet devoted to reviews of Canadian books, is available free at bookstores. According to a report of the official publication of the Canadian book trade, "Canadian books are by far and away the best sellers this year."⁹

Canadians are concerned about controlling their own book publishing. When an American publisher, McGraw-Hill, bought Ryerson Press in Toronto in 1970, there was great consternation—even though the firm had been offered for sale to Canadians for over a year. Shortly afterward, when the publishing firm of McClelland and Stewart Ltd. found themselves in financial trouble, the provincial government itself came to their aid to prevent the company from passing to foreign ownership.

Recently, Information Canada, the official publisher of Canadian government publications, with outlets in some major cities, opened its first branch in a university in the library of the University of Calgary to assist the university in its emphasis upon Canadian Studies. Here, in a centrally located area, faculty, students and citizens of Calgary can browse among or purchase popular and scholarly publications about their country.

It took 100 years after confederation before Canada had a distinctive building to house the National Library and the National Archives, but that library now exercises a significant influence as a national bibliographic center and serves the scholarly needs of the country much as does the Library of Congress in the United States. Canada still has no separate National Art Gallery building, but plans have just been announced to replace the present converted government office building in downtown Ottawa with a \$35-million National Gallery.

A new insistence upon greater Canadian content in the media is also now evident, although the struggle to compete with American television programs and American periodicals is proving difficult. Canadian radio and television stations are now required to give a larger percentage of time to Canadian talent, and some attempts have been made to protect the Canadian magazine market by placing certain tax disabilities on foreign publications. *Time* and *Reader's*

⁸ Ronald Sutherland, "Canada's Elizabethan Age?" *The Times Literary Supplement*, October 26, 1973, p. 1.

⁹ *Quill and Quire*, January, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁰ Dale C. Thomson, *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol. III, no. 1, spring, 1973, p. 9.

Digest, however, escape some restrictions by publishing Canadian editions printed in Canada.

The arts are being fostered by the Canada Council, a government-funded agency that makes grants to individual artists and scholars and to groups such as symphony orchestras and dramatic groups. The new National Arts Centre in Ottawa has gained international recognition for its development of Canadian talent; the National Symphony Orchestra and the National Ballet have won world acclaim on trips abroad; the National Film Board has won international prizes for Canadian productions; and individuals like Jon Vickers, Maureen Forrester and Glenn Gould have made a name for Canada on the world concert stage.

With Canadians asserting their new nationalism, Americans are beginning to show an interest in learning more about Canada. In 1967, Harvard University established the only Chair of Canadian Studies in the United States, and in 1969 Johns Hopkins University established the first graduate Center for Canadian Studies. Although at present only 10 percent of the more than 1,200 accredited colleges and universities in the United States offer courses on Canada, the tide is turning. According to a report published in the spring of 1973, "the number of American universities offering courses on Canada is growing at a remarkable rate, and this is happening not only in the border states but throughout the Union."¹⁰

Two hundred years ago, in 1775, an American force under the command of General Richard Montgomery tried to capture Quebec City and, hopefully, all of Canada; but after a long siege of Quebec, the Americans were routed by the French and English Canadians. Today, a plaque on the wall of the Château Frontenac in Quebec City commemorates the bravery and loyalty of the troops who preserved Canada for the Canadians. The plaque does not mention by name the American troops but speaks diplomatically of "the numerous and enterprising enemy"—words no doubt chosen in deference to the American tourists who yearly throng the corridors of this historic hotel.

Today, many Canadians feel that Canada has again been invaded by corporate armies who would conquer the land but, again, all Canada is uniting in a crescendo of confidence to preserve the Canadian heritage and to defend Canada against "the numerous and enterprising neighbor" whose presence has brought Canada together, fostered her national pride, and provided the impetus for the new surge of nationalism.

Kenneth M. Glazier was formerly Librarian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He was born in Canada and lived for some years in the United States, and has published various articles on the economic and cultural interaction of the two countries.

"The notion that Canada is a truly bicultural and bilingual country, with opportunities and outlets for its constituent groups, appears to be taking root. Canada's federal parties, regardless of their relative strength among English or French Canadians, are not only adamantly anti-separatist, but broadly agreed on sensitive, accommodative treatment of Quebec and the principle of biculturalism."

Quebec and Canadian Unity

BY HENRY S. ALBINSKI

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IT HAS OFTEN been remarked that, among Canada's ten provinces, Quebec is not *comme les autres*—like the others. Although always something of a cliché, the phrase has become altogether inadequate to describe the forces which in recent years have wrought change within Quebec, and have generated exceptionally delicate problems for the Canadian nation.

Quebec's principal quality of "difference" lies in its French personality, historically, socially, and culturally, as well as linguistically. The French of Canada are in a sense a "conquered" people. They came under British rule after France's defeat in North America over two centuries ago. Moreover, they are people whom at one time the British hoped to assimilate. Since the birth of modern Canada in 1867, the province of Quebec—where sentiment on behalf of confederating into Canada was noticeably divided—has been the center of the country's French ethos. The 1971 census revealed that in Quebec, people who were primarily French-speaking represented 80.7 percent of the population. In Canada at large, the figure was 26.9 percent, and in the great majority of provinces the figure was well under 10 percent. While Francophone minorities in other provinces have tended to lack real solidarity and resistance to Anglicizing influences, the Quebecois have by comparison held firm.

Quebec's position within Canada is central, not marginal. It is the largest province in territory, and second only to Ontario in population. Montreal, a great commercial and cultural center, is Canada's largest city. Quebec embraces the St. Lawrence river system, the gateway from the Atlantic to central Canada and the Great Lakes complex. Quebec contains enormous hydroelectric and extractive resources, as well as substantial industrial and agricultural structures.

The conventional image of French Quebec for a

very long time was that of a traditional society, defensive over its language, its Catholic religion, and the integrity of its family and community life against the encroachments of a more modern, open, secular, commercially oriented, and basically English-speaking North American environment. The Catholic Church's influence was directed toward these ends—not only in matters of morals and religion, but through its dominance in education, the social and welfare services, and even, for a period of time, as the inspiration for a branch of the province's trade union movement. Quebec's business and industry were dominated by the province's affluent English-speaking minority, while its politics fell into the hands of unprogressive, machine-dominated, and often corrupt French-speaking politicians. In general, the French public was, by Canadian standards, poorly educated and economically disadvantaged. In national politics, Quebec was valued for the seats it occupied in the House of Commons, but otherwise it was often treated patronizingly. Political success for a federal party in Quebec lay more in avoiding offense against Quebec's cultural sensibilities than in promoting its modernization.

Throughout much of Canada, English speakers learned a very different version of their nation's history than did their French counterparts in Quebec. To most Canadians, Quebec was a mixture of roughly one part exotica, two parts backwater. The vast majority of Canadians were not (and are not) sufficiently bilingual to communicate across cultural barriers (in 1971, only 13.4 percent were bilingual). Data made available by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and through other sources indicated that, in the 1960's, among the nation's young people both the French and the English speakers felt greater affinity with Americans than with one another.

The death of Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis

in 1959 and the defeat of his parochially oriented Union Nationale party at the hands of the provincial party the following year were symbolic of what seemed to be the passing of an era. By the decade of the 1960's, some striking changes were asserting themselves in Quebec. Some had been decades in preparation; others were relatively new. Taken together, they inspired fresh currents of opinion and behavior. The Church in Quebec moved toward a progressive posture. Trade union bonds with the Church were snapped, and the organized working movement acquired militant overtones. More modern, socially receptive, and secularized politics took hold in the province. Vast investments were made toward diversifying and strengthening the economy, expanding education and updating its tone, and in providing advanced health and other social programs. To plan and execute such objectives, a large, committed, and highly proficient bureaucratic apparatus was mobilized. A new, confident intellectual elite trenchantly explained and encouraged the theme of social change for Quebec.

As might be expected, these developments did not proceed evenly or quietly. Nor could they be isolated from the cultural legacy and milieu of Quebec, or from troubled reactions in the greater Canadian community. As various societies have learned, an inheritance of public attitudes cannot be wholly overturned in a few brief years. The impetus for modernization brings strain and division. Strategies of peaceful change within established structures, once set in motion, can spin off strategies of violence or the repudiation of familiar parameters within which the business of politics has been conducted.

A salient feature of the "winds of change" process in Quebec has been its intimate association with the province's cultural legacy. Introvertive, weak-aspirational, ascriptive cultural qualities helped for generations to sustain Quebec's relative undermodernity. So did the Quebecois' acquiescence in undergoing second-class economic citizenship under English-speaking dominance. The evidence seemed compelling. The studies of the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission and other studies consistently disclosed the inferior position of the French. French speakers were drastically underrepresented among the higher echelons of the federal civil service and in the official corps of the armed forces. To qualify for responsible positions in business and industry, both in or outside Quebec, they almost invariably needed to learn English, though few Anglophones needed to, or did, learn French. Many Quebecois who learned English and were able to move into the province's commercial establishment felt this could be done only at the expense of forfeiting their French personality. Indeed, within Quebec, unilingual English were on average earning nearly twice as much as unilingual

French, and nearly 30 percent more than *bilingual* persons of French extraction—all this in a province 80 percent French, but where less than one-sixth of the value of Quebec's industry was French-owned. Understandably, a favorite slogan of the times became *maitre chez nous*—master in our own house. The impulse for change harnessed the pride of membership in the French community within a basically English-speaking and otherwise different Canadian setting. The dignity associated with being French and the dignity associated with defeating blight, underemployment, lack of economic power, and ignorance tended to fuse in a concept of nationalism.

QUEBEC'S ASSERTIVENESS

Major steps have been taken in the past 15 years to help underwrite the ideal of the new, progressive nationalism. Quebec provincial governments have, with growing success, applied pressure on Anglophone-owned companies to convert to French as the language of work, thus facilitating the upward movement of Francophones and weakening the emotional gulf between the economically dominant minority and the French majority. There has also been a festering controversy over the appropriate medium of instruction in the schools. Some alarm has been raised in Quebec over the allegedly tenuous position of French in an English-speaking, North American sea. Quebec's birth rate has declined over the years, but migrants entering Canada are little inclined to settle in Quebec. Though holding 27 percent of Canada's population, Quebec in 1972 absorbed only 15 percent of the migrant intake. Among migrants who did settle in Quebec, 70–90 percent have been opting for English instead of French as their adopted language. Provincial legislation passed in 1969 allowed free choice of English or French as the medium of school instruction, although French is more comprehensively taught than English as a second language. But the measure has been under mounting attack, and the present Liberal party government appears to be acceding to more compulsion for migrants to adopt French, and more French-language exposure for the children of resident Anglophones.

In a province four-fifths French and caught up in nationalist sentiment, it is politically difficult to sidestep demands for more and faster Frenchification. Indeed, Quebec's Anglophones have been most uneasy about the summons. The province has experienced a few ugly French versus English confrontations over militant French insistence on phasing out English language instruction. On balance, the language controversy has probably contributed more to language/cultural group estrangement than to reconciliation. Not only is this a potential danger for intergroup relations, but a stern, pro-French language campaign may, by various accounts, be unnecessary, or even

counterproductive. In 1973, a special study group (the Gendron Commission) concluded that alleged threats to the French language had been exaggerated. The provincial Education Minister, himself a French Canadian, has warned that his compatriots could, unknowingly, be digging themselves into a hole. If, in time, most Anglophones were to become bilingual, but the French proudly took little notice of English and remained fundamentally unilingual, the Anglophones' linguistic advantage could, in reshaped form, return French Canadians to economic inferiority.

Quebec's effort to sustain the spirit of progressive nationalism has also been directed from Quebec City vis-à-vis the federal government in Ottawa. Although by no means alone among the provinces, Quebec has vigorously sought to obtain wider personal control over various programs and jurisdictional areas, while striving for a maximization of federal largesse—through grants, tax offsets, or whatever. It has received considerable concessions, but the climate of Quebec-Canada relations has often been strained, and a number of basic questions have yet to be resolved. For several years, and at an increasing rate, Ottawa has been plowing more money into Quebec than Quebec has been contributing to the national purse. Ottawa has wished to reserve primacy in a number of fields, not simply on grounds of technical constitutional claims, but because it has feared that reasonably uniform standards, and therefore coherent national development, could otherwise be undermined.

Quebec is presently in the forefront of demands for jurisdiction over telecommunications within the province, leaving only technical questions, such as the allocation of frequencies, to Ottawa. In effect, Quebec argues that its constitutional entitlement derives from provincial control over education and culture; its moral entitlement derives from its need to control content and language usage in the electronic media in order to foster the requirements of a French Canadian society based on "cultural sovereignty." Ottawa, in turn, stresses its jurisdictional rights over communications, and the need for a more centrally arranged, nationally unifying telecommunications system.

FEDERAL RESILIENCE

Despite a fairly obsolete constitutional document (the British North America Act of 1867, with amendments) Canadian federalism has proved itself resilient in recent decades. It has allowed for innovation in the collection and disbursement of moneys, elaborate, federal-provincial consultative mechanisms, and the de facto transfer or sharing of powers between Ottawa and the provinces. Two major efforts have been launched in the past decade or so under joint, federal-provincial auspices to devise a refur-

bished constitution. Both draft formulas acknowledged a stronger provincial role than had been prescribed in the BNA Act. Both took considerable account of Quebec's insistence on freedom of movement and jurisdictional latitude. Both, in the end, were rejected by Quebec on the claim that concessions to Quebec's special needs had not been adequately recognized.

This kind of atmosphere has prompted frustration among some national political elites, and among sectors of the Canadian public. As Quebec has become more assertive, or obdurate, many Canadians have asked whether any province, whatever its cultural or economic idiosyncrasies, deserves to have a "special status" bestowed upon it. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, himself a convinced federalist, once remarked that he believed in nothing special for Quebec, but everything for Quebecers. Affirmation of the notion that one province is more equal than others, many feel, could lead to a chain reaction of demands and counterdemands from Quebec and other provinces, the suppression of genuine national progress and sentiment, and possibly the breakup of a nation already geographically dispersed, overlaid by cultural and linguistic cleavages, and divided into provinces and regions very different in economic structure and levels of affluence. The Prairie provinces, for instance, have long harbored resentments over "Eastern" (i.e., Ontario and Quebec) financial and political domination at their expense.

As Quebec has become increasingly assertive, many Canadians have reacted with an impatient, "What does Quebec want?" The federal government has tried to accommodate the Quebecois, and to convince Quebec that Canada understands and even sympathizes with the new, energetic, and in some respects boisterous French Canadian nationalism. It is a matter of exceptionally high priority, the federal authorities have argued, to persuade Quebec's French that they can expect a full and dignified role within the greater Canadian community. While this rationale is broadly accepted in principle, a number of Canadians have regarded its consequences with annoyance and even petulance. Why should a wealthy Ontario or British Columbia or Alberta make inordinate contributions to the uplifting of a province which long chose to remain secluded? Why should people on the Prairies, and in British Columbia—where persons of French extraction are numerically incidental—have to accept what some regard as the "stuffing down their throat" of the French language under the terms of the Official Languages Act? Why should English-speaking persons, loyal to Canada and to the Crown, have to acquiesce in the gradual erosion of familiar and honored British symbols, ostensibly to satisfy the sensibilities of the French? Why should deserving, professionally compe-

tent Anglophones in the federal civil service or the armed forces be forced to learn French, or bypassed for advancement so that someone's ideal of a French Canadian or bilingual competence quota can be satisfied?

POLITICS AND THE QUEBEC PROBLEM

Reactions such as these have by no means been universal; when they have appeared, they have often been based more on half truth than on solid fact. All the same, the question remains whether the contemporary variant on the theme of the "Quebec problem" in Canadian life has induced estrangement rather than reconciliation between Quebec and Canada.

One way to search for an answer is through a resumé of recent electoral politics, both federal and Quebec provincial. The June, 1968, federal election was held against a background of demands by the then Union Nationale provincial government for "special status" for Quebec, and of a manifestation of separatist sentiment in the province. Quebec's problems were widely discussed during the campaign, but the major federal parties (Liberals, Progressive-Conservatives, New Democrats) all opposed special status, while generally agreeing upon sensitive, accommodative treatment for Quebec. Led by Trudeau, the new Prime Minister, the Liberals won impressively. The federal election of November, 1972, was set against a background of a now crystallized and confident separatist provincial party presence in Quebec, and of dramatic actions by separatist terrorists in 1970. The provincial Liberals had replaced the Union Nationale as Quebec's party of government, but the importuning of Ottawa for various concessions persisted. During the preceding four years, the Trudeau government had stuck to its federalist position, while undertaking various reforms designed to accommodate Quebec and French Canadians generally. It sponsored the Official Languages Act—intended to make dealings with federal instrumentalities equally accessible to French and English speakers, and to foster bilingual training. It promoted bilingualism in the civil service. It made generous allotments of funds to Quebec. Once again, as in 1968, the 1972 campaign was not marked by any basic party differences in policy toward Quebec, though Trudeau and the Liberals were at times scolded for tactical blunders. The Liberals lost both votes and seats in 1972; they barely survived in office, returning as a minority government.

For a variety of reasons, the federal Liberals have historically been inordinately strong in Quebec, while the Conservatives have been inordinately weak. These trends persisted in 1968 and 1972. In 1968, the Conservatives won four of Quebec's 74 seats on the basis of 21 percent of the popular vote, and in

1972 they slipped to two seats and 16 percent of the vote. In both elections, the Liberal vote was more than twice as large as the Conservative; each time, the Liberals captured 56 of the available 74 seats. But while in 1968 the Liberals made a respectable showing in English Canada, in 1972 they generally did not. Canada-wide, the Liberal victory of 1968 was aided by Trudeau's personal appeal. But, while only some 4 percent of the electorate ranked "Quebec" as the foremost issue, survey data indicated that about 16 percent of Trudeau's supporters were especially pleased by his position on Quebec.

This can be construed in two somewhat different ways. Perhaps many Anglophones voted for the Liberals because they believed there was a real chance for rapprochement between Quebec and Canada under a government led by a very able, federalist-committed, French Canadian, who could establish rapport and soothe relations with Quebec. Or perhaps the heavy pro-Liberal vote among Anglophones was inspired less by hope of genuine reconciliation with Quebec than by a wish that Trudeau would effectively "put Quebec in its place." On balance, the former explanation seems more persuasive—an explanation suggesting English-speaking willingness to accommodate Quebec.

In 1972, however, the Liberals suffered marked losses nearly everywhere west of Quebec—in Ontario, the Prairies, and in British Columbia. Again, only about four percent of the public admitted to perceiving the issue of Quebec as the most salient in the campaign. The Conservatives, traditionally a predominantly Anglophone-supported party, lost strength in French Quebec but soared ahead in English Canada, and as a result nearly deposed the Liberal government. The French language press was almost unanimous in alleging that the country had become politically polarized, since English Canada had "repudiated" Trudeau and the federal Liberals for their supposed coddling of Quebec and of French Canadians generally. Of the 109 Liberal seats in the newly elected House of Commons, over half—56—were from Quebec, while the Conservative delegation of 107 included only 2 from Quebec.

True, in a few Ottawa areas, a massive anti-Liberal vote suggested displeasure among civil servants and their families over Liberal party language policies. It is also true that there were signs of public discomfort in Ontario and the West over Liberal "concessions" to the French. Nevertheless, the evidence seems to offer a different picture. For instance, there was widespread public criticism of Trudeau's imputed arrogance, as well as a considerable improvement in the stature and overall image of his Conservative opponent, Robert Stanfield. The economy had turned down, and the Liberals appeared to lack effective answers, and this surely cost them votes. In

the Atlantic provinces, which are predominantly English-speaking, but where Ottawa had invested large sums for development programs, the Liberal vote more than held its own. The Conservatives' failure in Quebec can be interpreted as an extension of chronic weakness in the province, aggravated in 1972 by especially deficient party organization.

These and other considerations suggest that the 1972 vote was an English-French "polarization" far more in appearance than in substance. The principal disservice to Canada was that the election results *appeared* to reflect a breach between Quebec and the rest of the nation, and that in Quebec itself this myth was widely broadcast. It certainly played into the hands of separatists, who more vigorously than ever asserted the imprudence of Quebec's continued association with Canada.

SEPARATISM

An important dimension of the manner in which Canadian politics and society have been touched by the "Quebec question" has been the presence of separatist feeling in the province. Indeed, much of the federal government's effort to accommodate Quebec has been spurred by a wish to prove the separatists wrong; to demonstrate that Canada really cares about Quebec's special requirements, and therefore that a socio-economically progressive Quebec nationalism can coexist with Canadian nationhood and identity. For their part, political forces in Quebec that oppose separatism have felt compelled to demonstrate their own nationalist credentials, thereby improving leverage in the extraction of favorable treatment from Ottawa.

Quebec separatism has had both violent and peaceful tangents. Unreconstructed separatists committed to violence have always been a tiny minority, and have earned the scorn of the general Quebec population as well as of the vast majority of separatists. The terrorist Quebec Liberation Front carried out occasional bombings in the 1960's, and then in the fall of 1970 perpetrated a kidnapping and murder. The hypersensitivity of the federal and Quebec provincial governments to separatist terrorism was expressed in the imposition of the federal War Measures Act; for a time, with soldiers patrolling the streets and public buildings, Quebec resembled an armed camp. Since 1970, the Quebec Liberation Front has been unobtrusive. However, gradualist-minded separatists have most certainly not been eclipsed.

Separatism's principal political arm is the Parti Québécois (PQ), created in 1968 from among an amalgam of previously distinct separatist groups. Its message has been that most of history, including the recent period of dynamic change in the province, demonstrates that Quebec cannot either fulfill its socioeconomic potential, or protect its distinctive cul-

tural personality, within a greater Canadian context. We are reminded that separatists were especially insistent that the 1972 federal election polarized Canadian opinion, reflecting English-speaking repudiation of French aspirations. The PQ maintains that an independent Quebec, which would retain close working relations with the rest of the Canadian nation, would be a viable entity rather than a French-speaking version of a banana republic. The PQ's strategy calls for election control of the provincial government, followed by a period of negotiation with Ottawa and the other provinces over terms of separation, followed by a popular referendum in Quebec. If the referendum favored separation, the PQ would lead Quebec out of Canada.

The PQ's performance in Quebec politics has led to extensive controversy as to the real strength and meaning of separatist sentiment among the Quebecois. In the two provincial elections in which it has participated, the PQ has polled well, and its popular support has risen from 23 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1973; in both elections, it was the second most heavily supported party, after the provincial Liberals. In 1973, its vote was well ahead of the combined strength of all other opposition parties. Since the PQ is almost totally unsupported by Quebec's English-speaking minority, a 30 percent province-wide vote would appear even more impressive as evidence of the party's French Canadian following.

Among most pro-federalists in and outside of Quebec, however, the 1973 provincial election was heralded as a setback for separatism. Despite its popular vote, the PQ's representation in the Quebec legislature—due to various electoral constraints—has been exceedingly sparse. The party won only 7 of 108 seats in 1970, and only 6 of 110 seats in 1973. Its extremely articulate leader, René Lévesque, was defeated in his bid for a seat both times. The provincial Liberals, the most explicit pro-federalists in Quebec, improved their popular vote from a level of 45.4 percent in 1970 to 54.5 percent in 1973. The Liberals' lopsided majority of 1973 (102 of 110 seats) placed the PQ a great distance from control of office, and vitiated its role as opposition spokesman and sounding board for the separatist cause.

Moreover, federalists minimize, although they do not discount, the importance of the separatist PQ's popular vote. From the late 1960's onward, pro-separatist sentiment in Quebec ranged in the neighborhood of 8 to 10 percent, and in 1970 and 1973 less than half of the PQ's electoral backing was drawn from among separatists. In fact, as part of the strategy to broaden its electoral base, the PQ in 1973 considerably softened its separatist rhetoric. It abandoned its earlier promise of a quick march toward independence should it capture power. It now spoke more of "sovereignty" than of "separation,"

and promoted the rather innocuous slogan of *J'ai le goût du Quebec*, roughly translated as "I have a feeling for Quebec."

The PQ enjoys considerable following among college and university students and has connections in professional and intellectual circles, but the bulk of its constituency is the urban, French Canadian working class, especially in Montreal. The impulses of the past few decades have contributed to secularism, to a trade union movement with separatist overtones and firm socio-economic claims, and generally to a greater sense of injury and disaffection among workers who operate in a province with high levels of poverty and unemployment. The urban working class has become more explicitly politicized and radicalized. While the provincial Liberals are not a socio-economically regressive or even a conservative party, the PQ has stood out as an advocate of highly reformist social programs and participatory models. It is, in truth, a Quebec provincial version of a social democratic party, adapted to contemporary life quality criteria. This, then, is what accounts for a large proportion of the PQ vote—not the separatist ideal as such, but an assertive protest vote within a society where change has been rapid, and where the principle of distributive justice is rather widely seen as unfulfilled. The change has perhaps been too rapid to allow for the absorption of the claims of various, only recently mobilized elements. To the extent that the PQ vote is consciously separatist, in part it is the emanation of a quest for a French Canadian version of social justice which some feel can be better achieved under French Canada's own, independent aegis than under the more incremental, compromise-oriented and sometimes sluggish approach associated with the Canadian political system, or with the province of Quebec as an integral part of that system.

Separatism in Quebec is real, not imaginary, and its effects on Canada's national coherence cannot be casually dismissed. All the same, it does make a difference that separatist terrorism is almost universally discredited. The PQ, the size or composition of its electorate aside, has meticulously fostered democratic norms and procedures. In so doing, it probably has fortified the liberal-democratic ethic among a French Canadian community which in the past was imperfectly socialized into the spirit of the rule of law and of limited government. Moreover, as pointed out in 1970 by Claude Ryan, the influential editor of Montreal's *Le Devoir*, the PQ probably channeled toward democratic action many energies which otherwise would have leaned toward indifference, disgust, or even outbreaks of anarchy. It also served as a vehicle for many thousands of Quebecois, both separatists and non-separatists, who felt the need for political renewal. The contribution of the PQ to Quebec society, and in a sense to the Canadian politi-

cal system, can therefore be interpreted as catalytically constructive, not simply as disruptive.

The Liberals, winners of the 1973 provincial election, are by no means a traditionally catering party. They are a party with modern ideals, moderate to reformist in tone, drawing from a cross-section of Quebec society, and committed to the systemically supportive federalist ideal. They are not a party which foreseeably will fall from office, giving way to a separatist PQ, or to other parties. While social change in Quebec has been uneven, and thick patches of more traditional/parochial outlooks remain, the attraction of provincial parties appealing to such sentiments is currently minimal. Politics in Quebec has in a sense "polarized" between the federalist, moderate Liberals, and the separatist, highly progressive PQ. But, judging by the 1973 electoral campaign and other indicators, the dialogue between the two camps has become increasingly meaningful. There is less temptation among Quebec's political parties to hold up the federal government as a scapegoat for the province's ills. There has been a broadly ranging, systematic comparison of party views on Quebec's priorities. There is an increasingly buoyant economic climate, whose continuation could alleviate feelings of powerlessness and deprivation.

To be sure, there is lingering public doubt across Canada about the wisdom of ostensibly lavish, placative programs toward Quebec, and there is some feeling that the separation of Quebec from Canada may be inescapable. But the notion that Canada is a truly bicultural and bilingual country, with opportunities and outlets for its constituent groups, appears to be taking root. Canada's federal parties, regardless of their relative strength among English or French Canadians, are not only adamantly anti-separatist, but broadly agreed on sensitive, accommodative treatment of Quebec and the principle of biculturalism. Their example is important in the formation of public values. Indeed, a solidification of an all-Canadian national feeling, in part induced by some withdrawal from the cultural, diplomatic, and economic gravitational field of the United States, seems to be encouraging this process, and with it the weakening of familiar social cleavages.

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"One of the challenges facing Canadians in the 1970's is the development of the North. In a sense, this challenge is a battle against three foes: a hostile environment . . . ; a fragile economy . . . ; and a sparse and scattered population. . . ."

Canada's Last Frontier: The North

BY ROBERT M. BONE

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THE NORTH, AN ENORMOUS REGION with few people and little industry, represents much of Canada's future. With approximately two-thirds of the area of Canada and about one percent of the Canadian population, this vast northern territory is the last frontier of Canada and the final refuge of many of her aboriginal peoples. To them, rapid and total development spells the end of their ways of life and virtually eliminates any chance for them to adjust gradually to the new life style associated with an industrial society. Thus, the challenge of northern development is not simply the process of industrializing this area but also combining this process with the accommodation of northern peoples.

Geography has portrayed this region as a backwater and as a retreat for many aboriginal peoples. In the past, Western-styled colonization has been restricted because of the region's limited economic attractiveness. However, rapidly rising world demand for minerals and energy has substantially warmed the northern economic climate. Already some large-scale developments have taken place in a few centers, with the promise of many more to come. These developments have sparked social and political changes. To a considerable degree, the northward march of development and settlement is viewed with trepidation by many aborigines and some observers see it as an outright "invasion."

The historic roots of this apparent conflict between the developers and the natives appear to be based on the conflict of interests which culminated in the clashes between the Canadian government and the Métis in 1869-1870, and in 1885 between the government and the combined force of Indians and Métis. George Stanley describes this as "the problem of the frontier, namely, the clash between primitive and civ-


ilized peoples," and states that "to the half-breeds and Indians . . . civilization meant demoralization, decline and ultimate extinction."¹ In the Prairies, Canadian expansion led to friction and culminated in rebellion. Without new policies and programs, Canada's northern adventure could have a similar tragic ending.

To many, the Canadian North is an enigma. On the one hand, there is the image of Arctic waste, Eskimos, and polar bears, while on the other hand, there is the concept of vast mineral wealth which will cause many modern mining towns to arise and highly skilled and well-paid workers to migrate to the North. To some degree, both these perceptions of the North are true. The North does contain native peoples, wild animals, and substantial mineral resources. Perhaps a better way of viewing the North is in terms of its two major ecological environments, the areas of forest and tundra. This natural division has implications for northern people and for developers. Generally, the forested zone is referred to as the Mid-North, which includes the northern lands of seven provinces, much of the Yukon Territory, and the western half of the Northwest Territories (basically the district of Mackenzie). The tundra zone is considered the Far North, which consists of the Arctic Archipelago (basically the district of Franklin) and the eastern Arctic (district of Keewatin and northern Quebec). While Mid-Canada has felt the impact of development, the Far North, being a more difficult and expensive area to develop, is still awaiting such activities.

As defined by Louis-Edmond Hamelin, the Mid-North had a population of 210,546 in 1966, while the Far North had only 17,914.² Today, the population of the North is probably close to 300,000 with some 280,000 people living in the Mid-North. To a considerable degree, a measure of the relative degree of development of the two northern zones is revealed in these figures. Thus the Far North is by far the more sparsely populated and least developed area of Northern Canada. This zone is the true Arctic where almost all of Canada's people of Eskimo ancestry live.

¹ George F. G. Stanley, *History of the Riel Rebellions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. vii-viii.

² Louis-Edmond Hamelin, *L'écoumène du Nord canadien, The North: Studies in Canadian Geography*, edited by William C. Wonders (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 34.



CANADA AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

Until recently, the challenge of other frontiers has absorbed most of the nation's energy. Then, too, the North was the least attractive region of Canada for Western-style development and settlement. One result of the regional pattern of this nation-building has been to polarize Canadian development and population along the American border, a pattern described in an American geography book as follows:

Canada's twenty million appeared to be drawn as by a magnet toward the giant-neighbour on the South, for they are strikingly concentrated along the United States border. The Canadian ecumene is a narrow belt some 2,800 miles long and only 100 to 200 miles wide. About fifty percent of the settlement is within 100 miles of the Canadian-United States boundary, and 90 percent is within 200 miles.³

With the development of southern Canada now assured, the nation is taking a fresh look northward. In recent years, national concern has been focused upon arctic sovereignty, mineral development, and native peoples. Several projects now under discussion—the Mackenzie Valley pipeline route, the Athabasca tar sands, and the Churchill and James Bay hydroelectric schemes—could shape the development and settlement patterns for years to come. Whether the nation will attempt through public ownership or legislation to direct development more than it does at present is unclear. But it is clear that current developments are establishing the basic framework of the economy and society of the North, and that once this framework is set, much of the destiny of Canada's North will have been settled.

In the coming decades, the future of the North will be dependent upon the mining industry. In the past few decades, most economic development has centered on the mining industry, and this industry has more than doubled its production in the last ten years. In 1970, Canadian mineral production was valued at just under \$6 billion and about one-third of that production came from northern mines. Recent discoveries of vast gas deposits in the Arctic Islands, substantial quantities of iron ore on Baffin Island, and significant oil resources near the Mackenzie Delta give some indication of the enormous potential development. All of this means that the North could one day become the major mining region of Canada and perhaps of the Western world.

World economic conditions favor resource development and export, and Canada's North appears destined for this type of economic development, although it is subject to the shortcomings of foreign markets and price-demand vacillations. Only the intervention

of the government of Canada can alter this situation—as is apparently the case in the oil industry.

Primary development is the basis of the economic boom in the North, and without such economic development much of the change that has occurred in the North would not have taken place. Still this kind of development will stimulate only a modest population increase and limited economic growth. Constant emphasis upon highly automated mining operations coupled with continuing technological improvements in transportation suggests that a small, highly skilled and well-paid labor force will migrate North and that resources, like minerals, power, and timber, will be sent to existing industrial complexes in southern Canada, the United States, Japan, and West European countries. Furthermore, considering the existing remoteness from labor markets and the small and widely dispersed northern markets, significant private investment in the labor-intensive secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy seems most unlikely.

Even more unlikely is the channeling of large sums of public monies into such enterprises. For these reasons, some doubt may be cast upon the suggestion that by the end of this century the North's population and economy will grow as rapidly as the country as a whole. Indeed, unless the economy shifts from such a heavy reliance upon capital-intensive mining industries to labor-intensive processing industries, the working force will remain small and highly skilled, and development will be limited to the primary sector. Native Canadians, most of whom are either unable to compete in the labor markets or unconcerned about competitive individualism, will conclude that such development is for the benefit of others.

THE PLACE OF THE INUIT, INDIANS AND METIS

By far the most critical human element in this development is the role of Canadians of Indian and Eskimo ancestry. With more and more northerners of this ethnic background opting for settlement life, their limited participation in the wage economy, while understandable in view of their poor competitive position in the labor market, is a serious flaw. Left uncorrected, the continued failure of economic development to involve such people could fester into serious social and political problems. Yet given the course of northern development, a regional economy is emerging which is dominated by a primary industry characterized by a small but highly skilled labor force. Such a development will be an empty thing for the Indians, Eskimos and Métis, most of whom lack the experience and training for such employment. To this point, the Minister of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs revealed that in 1968, "these workers comprised only 5.3 percent of the total mine labor force of the Northwest Territories, or 63 men

³ G. T. Trewartha, A. H. Robinson, and E. H. Hammond, *Elements of Geography*, 5th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 542.

out of a total of 1,182 workers. In the Yukon, it was only 3.4 percent of the total industrial work force, or 28 men out of a total of 820.⁴ Without a doubt, the economic development of the 1960's of the North by-passed the vast majority of the original inhabitants. So far, the employment situation for natives in the 1970's has not been significantly different.

The North is not only a sparsely populated land but it also contains nearly half of Canada's Indians and Métis, and virtually all her Eskimos. This ethnic fact makes northern Canada radically different from southern Canada, and the resulting socio-economic setting is one that southern Canadians find difficulty in understanding and appreciating. As a consequence, the North contains a special challenge for Canada: How to deal with this important non-western minority? Considering that their natural rate of increase in the 1960's was about triple that of the Canadian average and that now approximately half of this population is under the age of 16, the importance of this special group of people is not diminishing. The challenge facing these Canadians and the Canadian society is a straightforward one—how successfully to transfer from non-commercial oriented economies and associated culture to a modern commercial culture with Western values.

While the roots of this change began with the first days of European involvement in the North, recent events have generated new forces calling for rapid social change. With the rate of change in the 1970's expected to accelerate, the question of whether northern people can keep pace is not academic. If not, the consequences could be unpleasant.

In general, the geographical distribution of these Canadians has three notable aspects. First, almost all now live in settlements and most of these are tiny villages with only a few non-natives. Those who live in larger centers usually reside in one part of town. This particular kind of urbanization of native Canadians began in earnest 20 years ago; before that time, few had any experience with village life. Changes in government policies did much to trigger this process, especially the programs advocating schooling for northern children and subsidized housing for Eskimos, Indians and Métis.

A second notable characteristic is the relationship between the geographic distribution of the northern peoples and the degree of commercial development: generally the weaker the commercial base, the greater the proportion of native Canadians. In centers where

commercial activities and public administration have appeared, involvement of northern peoples has been slight, sometimes because they have not desired most types of private and public employment, but more often because they lack the necessary qualifications. In any event, the developed areas and modern communities tend to be associated with southern Canadians who have migrated North in response to job opportunities, and underdeveloped areas and villages without any economic base are associated with native Canadians. Culturally, the latter communities have certain advantages because their isolation from economic development and associated white settlement acts as a protective cultural shield.

The low degree of geographical and occupational mobility of native northern Canadians is the third characteristic of this northern population. The main hindrances to increased mobility are a deep cultural attachment to the local milieu and a limited ability to compete in the national job market. As a result, during the 1960's, the per capita earnings from the gainful employment of native Canadians was reported as less than one-quarter of that of other Canadians.⁵

With an increasing number of young people growing accustomed to urban life and employment, labor mobility may rise, with more young people moving to towns and cities in search of work. While the concept of public subsidization of local industries is not unknown in Canada South, small native settlements and reserves in the North have yet to taste in a substantial way these fruits of Canadian life. In the 1970's, without a substantial increase in publicly supported developments in local areas, mobility will probably increase among the better educated young people, leaving the rest stranded in an economically depressed world where welfare dominates local life. To suggest that there is a simple solution to this question would be false. At the same time, there are signs that the northern peoples are beginning to understand Canadian life and how to function within that Western-oriented framework.

One of the challenges facing Canadians in the 1970's is the development of the North. In a sense, this challenge is a battle against three foes: a hostile environment with permafrost, muskeg, long cold winters; a fragile economy which inhibits normal kinds of economic, social and political development; and a sparse and scattered population consisting of a large contingent of native peoples, who as a group

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⁴ Jean Chrétien, 1969. Speech by the Honorable Jean Chrétien, P.C., M.P., Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to the Yellowknife Board of Trade, Yellowknife, N.W.T., November 10, 1969.

⁵ H. B. Hawthorn, *A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada: Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policy*, Vol. I (Ottawa: Dept. of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Queen's Printer, 1966).

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"... the more important macro-problems of the Canadian economy are related in no small way to what appears to be a systematic mismanagement of the economy by the Department of Finance of the government of Canada and by the Bank of Canada.

Trends in the Canadian Economy

BY ALBERT BRETON

Professor of Economics, University of Toronto

COMPARED WITH THE OTHER ECONOMIES of the developed world, the Canadian economy has done well over the last few years. This is not to imply that problems have not arisen. But either these have been dealt with or, compared to problems that have arisen or have been created elsewhere, Canada's problems have not been very large.

The rate of growth of Canada's real gross national product for the years 1971 and 1972 was constant at 5.8 percent, a figure which indicates that the economy was performing slightly below its potential, which the Economic Council of Canada in its *Tenth Annual Review* published early in 1973 indicated to be around 6.0 percent. The still unrevised rate for 1973 is 6.75 percent, which seems to point to a rate slightly above potential.

The average figure for 1973 and its relation to the potential of the economy can, however, be easily misinterpreted for at least two reasons. First, the quarter with the highest rate of growth was the first one, from January to March; each successive quarter had a lower rate than the preceding one. It is because the growth rate of the first quarter, following upon a strong fourth quarter in 1972, was very high—almost 12 percent in real terms—that the average figure for the year looks so good. Second, when an economy has been operating below its potential for some time, a rate above the potential will usually be required for a short time to bring the economy to its potential long-term trend. This "re-entry problem," as it is now fashionable to call it, is difficult to resolve, but it should caution us not to be too hasty in saying that a growth rate of 6.75 percent was above potential. If the quarterly rates had been close to the average, that rate would have been close to the desired one for 1973; once disaggregated, it appears to be probably too low.

In any case, most forecasters are now predicting a rate of growth for 1974 in the neighborhood of 4 percent. A number of observers are imputing the lower growth rate to the energy crisis facing a large number of the countries of the world today. It is well to keep

in mind that the lower forecasted rate for 1974 is only marginally out of line with the behavior of the economy in 1973. The discussion of Canada's monetary and fiscal position that follows will include possible explanations of the fact that the economy has had a chronic tendency to sink back below potential after brief spurts above that trend.

There can be no doubt that the problems on the energy front will adversely affect the rate of growth of the Canadian economy. The main—if not the only—channel through which energy will adversely affect Canada is international trade. Indeed, it is only because Canada's exports will decline as a result of reduced economic activity in other parts of the world, but in particular in the United States and also Europe, that the country's growth rate will decline.

Were it not for this indirect effect through exports, the impact of what Canada's mass media, mimicking the language developed elsewhere, call the energy crisis would be largely limited to the prices, to changes in the profit levels of oil companies, to changes in the level of royalty revenues of some provinces, and to changes in equalization payments made by the federal government to provincial governments, because the equalization formula includes in its base the revenues from royalties.

It may come as a surprise to an American or to a British or other European reader—and possibly even to the Canadian reader whose only facts come from his daily newspaper—that there has not been an energy crisis in Canada in recent months, and that there is not likely to be one in the near future, unless the price of energy is maintained at an artificially low level, as it currently is, thus preventing large and socially useful substitutions away from products such as plastics and fertilizers that use important amounts of crude oil, or unless the country "regulates" itself, through its National Energy Board and other similar bureaucratic bodies, into not having the capacity to refine the gasoline, the kerosene and the other derivatives the coun-

try needs in the proportions in which they are needed.

Canada has not experienced an energy crisis like most other countries of the world largely because of good luck and moderate to good public management. Public management has not only made it possible to insure domestic supplies of each sub-class of products, but has made it possible to increase exports of crude oil to the United States while also increasing imports from various sources.

It should also be noted that the fairly strong performance of the economy has been, until recently, largely fuelled by demand originating in every sector of the economy, except in business investment and in the public sector.

THE EMPLOYMENT LEVEL

The level of employment is, of course, fairly closely related to the rate growth of the economy, but because for a very large proportion of the population employment is the main source of income, and also because unemployment is a politically sensitive issue, it should be noted that on that count also the Canadian economy has been functioning well, though not so well as it could have.

Over the past decade, for example, the growth of the labor force in Canada has been double that of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan *combined*. Even though the level of unemployment has remained high in recent years—the average for 1973 was 5.6 percent—the amount of employment created has been very large and very impressive.

Many critics of the federal government's policy impute the high rate of unemployment or the apparent difficulty in bringing that rate down to the introduction in 1972 of a new (and indeed very generous) scheme of unemployment insurance compensation. It is impossible in the space available to describe the new program, but it will suffice to say that entitlement to two-thirds of one's earnings up to a maximum (currently) of \$115.00 a week is easy to establish; abuse of this entitlement is difficult to police. Some critics have argued that possibly 2 percent of those currently unemployed are individuals who choose to "live" on the unemployment insurance scheme instead of working. Such estimates appear to this writer to be on the high side, but there can be no doubt that the new scheme has added to the statistics of unemployment and that the 3.0 and 3.5 percent unemployment targets of the 1960's are now unattainable because of this scheme and also because of continuous increases in the legal minimum wage.

One should add that the now generous unemployment benefits make unemployment much less of a social problem, a fact that is still largely unrecognized, though it is slowly being acknowledged by public opinion.

INFLATION

Like other countries in the world, in recent years, and particularly in 1973, Canada had a very high rate of inflation. The prospects, furthermore, are for rates in the range of 8 to 10 percent in 1974. The causes of these large price increases are still poorly understood, but there can be little doubt that a fraction of the increase can be explained by the effect of international forces and, in particular, by the excessively large amount of international liquidity now in existence. It is true that, in principle, Canada is on a flexible exchange rate, which of itself should insulate her from such influences, but in practice the exchange rate is a managed one—not usually by direct intervention in the foreign exchange market, but indirectly, by adjusting the supply of money—so that the rate is not really flexible enough to insulate the economy from foreign influences.

Another important source of price increases has been the very substantial variation in some micro-component of supply or demand in the face of short-run administered prices. For example, in recent years health and hospitalization have been completely socialized, with a consequent massive increase in expenditures for these services, which in turn has led to important increases in the price of these variables. There has also been an important reduction in the availability of foodstuff during 1973, also leading to large price increases. Since in the short run, at least, there is not sufficient reduction in the prices of other commodities from which demand is moving, the Central Bank must finance the shifts in supply or demand and thus convert what would be relative price changes into absolute price changes. A decision not to do so would lead to further unemployment.

Whatever the cause of the inflation, the Canadian government has so far refrained from resorting to wage and price controls and has therefore not created for itself the host of problems—including social unrest and violence—that comes from such controls. Indeed, except for a few sectors, such as crude oil, prices have been free to adjust and move to clear markets. This is one reason the economy has worked as well as it has.

The government's program to deal with inflation can be divided into two broad classes. First, it has indexed almost all welfare payments, public pension schemes, and so on, so that these payments are independent of price changes. It has also, effective Jan-

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"That Canada's formal political institutions are somewhat out of harmony with the society they serve has been apparent for some time, particularly since the early 1960's. During that decade, Maritime and Western alienation from the national political scene has become increasingly pronounced."

Developing Regionalism in the Maritimes and Western Canada

BY THOMAS ALLEN LEVY

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CANADA'S TERRITORIALLY BASED cultural cleavages, extreme sectionalism, limited sense of common national identity and non-class, non-ideological party system make her virtually unique among contemporary federations, both old and new.* However, these acute societal divisions are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing. Problems of cultural and linguistic dualism dominated the Canadian political scene in the 1960's. The issues of the 1970's thus far seem to be conflicts between center and periphery and between rich and poor provinces.

The delineation of Canadian regions other than Ontario and Quebec is not an easy task. For statistical purposes, Canada is conventionally divided into Atlantic (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick), Quebec, Ontario, Prairie (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta) and British Columbia regions. However, Canada's 102-seat Senate is composed of four districts: Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and West (the Prairies plus British Columbia). In the Atlantic region, a strong case can be made for considering Newfoundland apart from the other provinces which are commonly known as the Maritimes. In the assessment of regional blocs, however, the chief criterion should be the ability of each "to undertake political action on its own behalf."¹ Hence, the appropriate divisions are the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the West. In what follows, the differences between "Atlantic" and "Maritime," and

"Prairie" and "Western" should be readily apparent.

In 1971, the Atlantic provinces accounted for 5.5 percent of Canada's total area of 3,851,809 square miles and 9.5 percent of a total population of 21,568,311. The corresponding figures for the West are 29.1 percent and 27.0 percent. Although Canadians of British origin predominate in both regions, the largest minority in Atlantic Canada is the French-speaking Acadian group, while a high proportion of the 25 percent of the population of non-British, non-French origin, particularly Germans and Ukrainians, reside in the West.

Both regions are primary-producing, while secondary manufacturing sets the economic pace in central Canada. In 1967, Atlantic Canada contributed 5.0 percent of the value added in goods-producing industries while the West accounted for 27.9 percent.² However, Nova Scotia and Manitoba are the most industrialized provinces in their respective regions. Substantial proportions of Canada's 16 principal products originate in the West. These include newsprint paper, wood pulp, softwood lumber, wheat, fertilizers and fertilizer materials, aluminum and alloys, copper and alloys, nickel, crude petroleum and natural gas. Of the Atlantic provinces, the only significant producer of one of these commodities is Newfoundland, which has large deposits of iron ore. In 1967, an average of 52.0 percent of these goods were destined for export markets, particularly the United States. When world markets are glutted with these commodities, the Western economies are adversely affected to a considerable degree. When international demand is strong, however, the West is in an excellent position to redress its grievances with central Canada and to diversify its economic base. In either case, there is considerable scope for West-Central clashes of interest. The Atlantic region has been econom-

* I gratefully acknowledge the assistance given me by officials of Information Canada, the Council of Maritime Premiers and the governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.

¹ R. D. Howland, *Some Regional Aspects of Canada's Economic Development* (Ottawa, 1957), p. 2.

² A. L. Boykiw, "One Prairie Province and Regional Development," in *One Prairie Province? A Question for Canada: Proceedings and Selected Papers*, ed. by David K. Elton (Lethbridge, Alta.: Lethbridge Herald, 1970), p. 383.

ically depressed and dependent upon federal subsidies since confederation over 100 years ago. Nevertheless, commercially significant quantities of oil and gas off the Atlantic coast and a number of deep water ports astride major shipping lanes may combine to give Atlantic Canada a brighter economic future.

For both regions to realize their aspirations, however, some alteration of the economic and political arrangements of the Canadian federation seems to be required. This is easier said than done, given the relative lack of peripheral regional influence and power in the institutions of the central government. The appointed Canadian Senate never fulfilled its original purpose of protecting regional interests. As for the popularly elected 264-seat House of Commons, the Atlantic region has 32 seats, while the West accounts for 68. This combined total of 100 M.P.'s allotted to eight provinces out of ten is insufficient to control the House, even in the absence of party discipline. In addition, the norm of party solidarity renders Atlantic and Western representation in Parliament still less meaningful.

Psychological regionalism in both areas persists in historical tradition, public opinion and voting behavior. The Maritimes and Newfoundland were the earliest settled areas of Canada, and by the late eighteenth century each of the four provinces was a crown colony. Between 1926 and 1933, Newfoundland enjoyed political independence within the British Commonwealth. Of the Western provinces, the only one to have enjoyed crown colony status prior to confederation was British Columbia; the others were created by legislative fiat of the federal government. Thus, while Maritimers are heir to traditions which predate confederation, Westerners developed a regional identity out of a recent pioneering experience and the economic adversities of the 1920's and 1930's.

Both regions appear to have been treated as colonies by the federal government. Of a total of 114 provincial statutes disallowed by the central authorities from 1869 to 1943, no less than 88 emanated from Western legislatures, while another 10 were products of Atlantic Canada. Of 67 bills reserved by provincial lieutenant governors for approval or disapproval in Ottawa, 36 were of Western origin while 23 were Maritime enactments.³

According to a poll taken in 1969 by the *Toronto*

³ These figures are compiled from G. V. LaForest, *Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1965), Appendices A and B, pp. 83-115.

⁴ *Coast to Coast, Canada 70: A Summary* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1969), p. 148.

⁵ *Public Opinion and Canadian Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 147.

⁶ Market Facts of Canada Limited, *The Maritimes and Maritime Union: An Opinion Study* (Fredericton, N. B.: Maritime Union Study, 1970), Table 43, p. 75.

⁷ *Coast to Coast, Canada 70*, pp. 149-50.

Telegram, almost 80 percent of Ontarians identify with Canada as opposed to their province or region, while 37 percent of the Maritimers put their province first and another 15 percent opt for their region. In the Prairies, 18 percent claim a regional identity and a further 16 percent are province-oriented. No less than 23 percent of the British Columbians put their province first, while another 9 percent see themselves primarily as Westerners.⁴ In measuring group homogeneity, Professor Mildred Schwartz ranked the Maritimes first in a class by themselves, followed by the Prairies, Quebec, British Columbia and Ontario in that order.⁵ An opinion survey commissioned by the Maritime Union Study found that 65 percent of Maritimers felt that they had more in common with New Englanders than with Ontarians (33 percent) or Quebecers (10 percent).⁶

On specific issues, the *Toronto Telegram* found that Canadians as a whole ranked the chief weaknesses of confederation as the problem of two cultures, an outdated constitution and regional economic disparities in that order. However, almost half the Maritimers gave precedence to regional disparities, while residents of the Prairies assigned that problem rank two. British Columbians seemed to share the views of Ontarians. As to remedial action, both the Maritimes and the Prairies put correction of regional economic disparities in first place.⁷ Maritimers and Westerners part company concerning support for bilingualism and receptivity to continued high levels of American investment. Maritime attitudes on both issues are decidedly more positive than the national average, while the opposite is true of Western Canadians. Overall, currents of public opinion in the Maritimes and the West, while not always internally consistent or in agreement with each other, are commonly opposed to "national" viewpoints on questions of identity and on specific political issues.

While the electoral system exacerbates considerably sectional voting and parliamentary representation, it is precisely the outcomes of the electoral process which are significant for any assessment of Canadian political regionalism and its effect on national unity. Both the Maritimes and the West have been consistently underrepresented in federal Cabinets since confederation. Since 1921, third parties won pluralities or majorities of Western seats in five out of 16 federal elections. Only during the Progressive Conservative administration of John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) did both Maritimers and Westerners feel that the federal government was working on their behalf. In the seven federal elections held since 1957, a majority of Atlantic M.P.'s occupied the government benches in the House of Commons four times (1957, 1958, 1962, 1963) while most Prairie members and British Columbians were part of the government caucus twice (1958 and 1962, 1958 and 1968 respec-

tively). By contrast, majorities or pluralities of Quebec and Ontario M.P.'s were on the winning side no less than five times each. The Maritimes and the West have been virtually absent from the seat of power in Ottawa since 1965.

In the 1972 federal election, the overall results in seats won were: Liberals, 109; Progressive Conservatives (PC's), 107; New Democratic party (NDP), 31; Creditistes, 15; Independents, 1; and one vacancy, for a total of 264. However, of the 32 Atlantic seats, the PC's won 22, while of 68 Western seats, that party gained 42 and the NDP placed second with 19.⁸ In order to remain in power after the election, the Liberals entered into a *de facto* coalition with the NDP. This gave them a plurality of Ontario seats and respectable presence in the West; but there was no sharing of Cabinet portfolios between the two parties.

Naturally, these results produced distortions in the regional balance of the federal Cabinet. Of 28 ministers, the Atlantic and Western regions got four each, while Quebec and Ontario secured nine and ten respectively. Moreover, of the portfolios held by Atlantic M.P.'s, only one of significance (Regional Economic Expansion) is held by a native son, while none of the Western ministers heads a department of economic significance to his region. Indeed, of seven departments which have a considerable impact on the economic development of both regions (Finance; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Regional Economic Expansion; Energy, Mines and Resources; Transport; Agriculture; Supply and Services), four are held by Ontarians and two by Quebecers (Transport, Supply and Services). Although the concentration of military bases in the Atlantic provinces provides a fillip to the regional economy, the defense department is headed by a Westerner. There is no suggestion here that the major function of Cabinet ministers is to use their portfolios for the benefit of their respective regions, but it would be strange if they did not do so to some extent.

Only the PC's hold a majority of both Atlantic and Western seats in the House of Commons. Not surprisingly, regional Atlantic, Prairie and British Columbia blocs have emerged within the parliamentary caucus of that party. Although the regional caucuses have had some success in getting their particular concerns adopted as party policy, the fact remains that the PC party has not controlled the central government since 1963.

⁸ Data for the 1957-1968 elections was taken from Hugh G. Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1972), Appendix, pp. 238-47; while the 1972 results were provided by Information Canada.

⁹ Dalhousie Institute of Public Affairs and Richard H. Leach, *Interprovincial Relations in the Maritime Provinces* (Fredericton, N. B.: Maritime Union Study, 1970), pp. ix and 31-32.

Voters who are disenchanted with the federal government can always vote for an opposition party in a provincial contest. Of the ten provincial elections held since 1968, the Liberals won only three, including two in their Quebec stronghold. Indeed, the NDP, a minor party nationally, controls three of the four Western provincial governments (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia).

Hence, a double deadlock persists in Canadian politics. Majority governments have resulted only twice from the last seven federal elections (1958, 1968). In addition, the Liberal administration in Ottawa now faces seven out of ten provincial governments controlled by its political enemies. In this state of affairs, commonality of party background cannot be called upon to smooth over the tensions inherent in a federal system. Consequently, a species of "executive federalism" has emerged as a significant source of public policy-making in Canada during the last decade. The prevailing political style is for the heads of the 11 governments, supported by ministers and officials, to develop public policy in meetings resembling international conferences. Their respective legislatures are often reduced to "ratifying" the "treaties" thus arrived at, assuming that legislation is necessary in the first place. This recent development in Canadian federalism is, to a large extent, the immediate source of the new political regionalism in the Maritimes and in the West.

MARITIME AND WESTERN REGIONAL BLOCS

Strange as it may seem, regional meetings of provincial Premiers are by-products of the revived and reinvigorated federal-provincial and interprovincial intergovernmental conferences rather than vice versa. The formation in 1954 of the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC), with the encouragement and support of the four governments, marked the first major integrative step in the Atlantic region. A highly respected organization, APEC has concentrated on economic research geared to economic growth and to fostering intergovernmental cooperation. APEC, in turn, influenced the institution of an annual Atlantic Premiers Conference, which held its first meeting in 1957. Besides furthering interprovincial cooperation, the Premiers attempted to establish common positions on such federal-regional issues as a hydroelectric power grid, federal defense spending in the region and the negative effects of the tariff on the regional economy.⁹ Another function of the annual meeting was to develop unified positions for the general intergovernmental conferences.

Political regionalism took longer to develop on the Prairies, however. Attempts to institutionalize an annual Premiers' meeting were unproductive until October, 1965, when the three heads of government met as the Prairie Provinces Economic Council. The

resulting annual one-day conferences focused on transportation, agriculture, resource development and conservation and social and cultural policy. However, the institution did not appear to be very effective.

The effects of these differing regional experiences in intergovernmental cooperation were plainly visible during the course of the abortive exercise in constitutional revision (1967-1971). Although this series of intergovernmental conferences was ostensibly called to deal with Quebec's place in confederation, the federal government imposed its own priorities on the meetings. In particular, Ottawa sought the implementation of the linguistic recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the constitutional entrenchment of human rights, the maintenance and extension of federal taxing and spending powers and the approval of a domesticated constitutional amending formula. Within this framework, however, the Atlantic strategy seemed to be to accept these federal proposals while pressing, with single-minded zeal and determination, for the redress of regional economic disparities. With the exception of linguistic rights, there seemed to be no break in Atlantic solidarity during the entire exercise. The rewards came in the form of an agreement by the constitutional conference of February, 1968, to discuss regional economic disparities in future meetings, the establishment of the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion in 1969 and a moral commitment on the part of governments to reduce regional economic disparities written into the Canadian Constitutional Charter of 1971. That the latter document is null and void is not the fault of Atlantic Canada.

By contrast, the instances of Western or Prairie caucusing were rare. The Western provinces did not initially appear to take the conferences seriously and the only issue which seemed to unite them was the federal government's bilingualism policy which they vigorously opposed. At the February, 1969, meeting the three Prairie Premiers, with support from British Columbia, issued a joint statement condemning a proposed official languages bill. This meeting was also notable for the rhetoric of Western solidarity. However, when Edward Schreyer, the newly elected Premier of Manitoba, supported the official languages act, the Westerners appeared less united at the December, 1969, installment of the constitutional conference. Nevertheless, the four Premiers did criticize the railways' discriminatory freight rates and the heads of the three westernmost provinces issued a joint condemnation of the federal government's tax reform proposals. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Western governments got

little sympathy in Ottawa when serious difficulties in marketing their wheat, potash, oil and other resources were encountered.

In 1964, New Brunswick Premier Louis Robichaud revived the hoary notion of Maritime Union. The idea quickly gained momentum for a number of reasons, including the possibility of Quebec's secession from Canada, the need for a stronger regional attack on its long-standing economic ills, the existence of artificial hindrances to intra-regional trade and the high cost of government overhead for a small population. From Ottawa's point of view, the consolidation of the Atlantic provinces would simplify the administration of federal economic development programs in the region. The Atlantic Premiers Conference discussed the proposal at the 1964 meeting. In consequence, the Premiers of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick obtained from their respective legislatures in 1965 identical resolutions supporting a study of Maritime Union. With the concurrence of Prince Edward Island in 1967-1968, the study was launched.¹⁰

And a most impressive undertaking it was. Separate studies considered the relationship between Maritime Union and public finance, federal-provincial fiscal relations, intergovernmental relations, industrial development policies, implications for the French language and culture, medicare and health and welfare services, and data processing trends. In addition, studies of public opinion and of relevant experiences in other countries and groups of countries were commissioned. The distinguished individuals associated with the project included John Deutsch, former chairman of the Economic Council of Canada, who served as Special Adviser; Fred Drummie, Economic Adviser to the government of New Brunswick, who acted as Executive Director; R. M. Burns, Director of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University and a former official of the federal Department of Finance; and Richard H. Leach, an American authority on federalism. Funds for the study were provided by Ottawa and by the three Maritime governments.

The opinion survey revealed majorities favoring political union, ranging from a low of 58 percent in Prince Edward Island to a high of 68 percent in New Brunswick. A notable feature of the New Brunswick vote was the solidarity of the province's Anglophones regardless of such demographic distinctions as income, education and age. Perhaps this reflected a desire for a larger political structure in which the political strength of the province's Acadian minority would be diluted.

Hearings were held in each province so that interested groups and individuals could present public briefs. Those organizations favoring Maritime political union included the Boards of Trade of Amherst,

¹⁰ *The Report on Maritime Union Commissioned by the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island* (Fredericton, N. B.: 1970).

N.S., and Saint John, N.B., the City of Moncton, N.B.; the Atlantic Cooperative Council, the Atlantic Fresh Produce Association, APEC, and the Atlantic Division of the Canadian Manufacturers Association. Among the groups not expressly committed to full political union but favoring the region-wide functional integration of one or more services were the Atlantic Provinces Transportation Commission, the Atlantic Region Work Study Centre, the Atlantic Region of the Canadian Conference of University Schools of Nursing, the Nova Scotia Teachers Union, the Dalhousie Bureau of Industrial Relations, the Police Association of Nova Scotia and provincial officials concerned with surveying and mapping. The principal opposition to the merger of the provinces stemmed from Acadian organizations, institutions and individuals in New Brunswick who feared the dilution of their political power and the erosion of their hard-won cultural gains in a larger entity.

Needless to say, the Maritime Union Study favored full political union and recommended as interim measures during a specified trial period the creation of a Council of Maritime Premiers, a Maritime Provinces Commission and a Joint Legislative Assembly. The Council would provide political leadership, the Commission would function as a regional bureaucracy and the Assembly would consider the reports of the other two bodies and proposals for uniform legislation.¹¹

There is as yet no consensus among the Maritime Premiers regarding full political union.¹² Hence, the only institution recommended by the Maritime Union Study which has been created thus far is the Council of Maritime Premiers. A truncated "Joint Legislature" lives a limbo-like existence. There has been strong resistance to the establishment of the Commission and it now appears that the Council has arrogated to itself some of the Commission's functions. Indeed, it is probable that the Premiers' Council would have been set up in any event, with or without the union study, though that exercise undoubtedly served as a catalyst.

On May 25, 1971, the Premiers of the three Mar-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-78. The background of these proposals is dealt with by R. M. Burns, *Experience of National and International Co-operative Institutions* (Fredericton, N. B.: Maritime Union Study, 1970).

¹² See *Canadian Public Administration*, XV (Winter, 1972), pp. 591-609 for the texts of the Premiers' addresses to the 1972 annual meeting of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada.

¹³ Some commentators view Maritime Union or integration as Ottawa's "final solution" for the region. See Richard Wilbur, "The View from the Maritimes," *MacLean's* (June, 1972), p. 9.

¹⁴ For details, see the Council's *First Annual Report* issued in February, 1973. There is a fair degree of correspondence between the briefs calling for integration of one or a few services during the Maritime Union hearings and the services actually integrated.

time Provinces signed an agreement setting up the Council, a continuing committee "of the persons from time to time holding the offices of Premier" of their respective provinces. Its stated functions include the discussion of all relevant matters, "the initiation of studies of economic, social and cultural programs and policies," the "coordination of public policies," the "approval of joint submissions . . . to the Government of Canada or any agencies thereof," the "initiation and sustaining of joint programs" and "power to constitute a Maritime Provinces Commission, to define its duties and functions, and to appoint the members thereof." The Council is to meet at least four times a year with rotation of conference sites and chairmen. Decisions must be unanimous. Funds provided by each province are prorated according to population. By December, 1973, the Council had held 12 meetings.

The Council is served by a permanent secretariat including a Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries. The latter are senior civil servants seconded by the governments of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Inasmuch as the Council was launched amid constitutional and political uncertainties in Canada, few men were more qualified to serve as the organization's first Secretary than Edgar Gallant, a Prince Edward Island Acadian who became a senior federal official with considerable experience in federal-provincial financial relations and who played a crucial role in the constitutional review process. When his appointment terminated, he was replaced by Alton Lomas, a native Nova Scotian and a senior official of the federal Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce,¹³ who had been seconded to the government of Nova Scotia as Deputy Minister of Development. Lomas' appointment signifies that, for the foreseeable future, the accent of the Council's activities will be on economic growth. In its first year of operation, the emphasis was placed on the integration and rationalization of government services.¹⁴

As the collective voice of the Maritime Premiers, the Council prepared briefs and met with representatives of the federal government, other provinces, and states regarding these subjects: regional economic expansion, offshore mineral rights, fisheries, the coasting trade, transportation and air services, broadcasting and communications, energy, tax reform and securities legislation. The Premiers won at least two important victories: an increase of federal subsidies on specified westbound rail shipments and the phased application of Ottawa's policy of eliminating foreign vessels from the coasting trade.

The Council did the staff work for the participation of the Maritime Premiers together with their Quebec and Newfoundland colleagues in a meeting in August, 1973, with the New England Governors' Conference. Among other things, the participants

discussed energy and transportation as they affect trans-border trade. Preparations are currently underway for another intergovernmental Premiers-Governors meeting scheduled for the summer of 1974.

Two weeks after the April, 1970, Quebec election, in which the independence party won some 24 percent of the popular vote, the University of Lethbridge in Alberta hosted a conference to consider the desirability and practicability of One Prairie Province. Unlike the Maritime Union study, the Lethbridge conference was neither sponsored nor endorsed by any government. However, Prairie and federal politicians and officials and other distinguished personages attended. Among the guest speakers and panelists were the federal Ministers of Supply and Services and Regional Economic Expansion; the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, Ottawa; the Director of the Constitutional Review Section, Privy Council Office, Ottawa; Alvin Hamilton, federal M.P. and former Cabinet minister; R. M. Burns of Queen's University; Fred Drummond of the Maritime Union Study; Dale Thomson, one-time special assistant to former Prime Minister St. Laurent; the Premier of Alberta; the Saskatchewan Attorney-General; the Manitoba Minister of Industry and Commerce; Peter Lougheed, leader of the Progressive Conservative Opposition in Alberta; and Allan Blakeney, New Democratic member of the Saskatchewan legislature. There did not appear to be any prominent British Columbians present.

Prairie union was discussed in terms of its constitutional, sociological,¹⁵ political, economic, and developmental implications. Alternatives to full political union were also considered. Although a number of speakers offered the same justifications for Prairie union as were advanced in the case of the Maritimes, the politicians favored a strengthened Premiers' Council and a Prairie equivalent of APEC.

This informal political consensus was given added impetus when Blakeney and Lougheed became Premiers of their respective provinces as a result of elections in 1971. Closer working relationships among the Premiers and the officials of the three provinces developed shortly thereafter.

As a result of the 1972 federal election, the Liberal administration promised (in its January, 1973, throne speech) to convene a conference on Western Eco-

nomic Opportunities. In the spring of 1973, the three Prairie Premiers, joined by David Barrett, their New Democratic colleague in British Columbia, met and decided to present to the Conference a common front on a short list of proposals deemed fundamental to Western economic development. The Premiers met again in June, 1973, to continue their preparations, while joint teams of ministers and officials worked in four particular areas. The result was four joint position papers dealing with transportation, agriculture, economic and industrial development opportunities, and capital financing and regional financial institutions. The conference was duly held in Calgary, Alberta, in July, 1973, and the Western Premiers exhibited a degree of unity rivalling that of their Atlantic counterparts. Conspicuous by its absence on the agenda, however, was the energy issue, on which there was no Western consensus.

The four Western Premiers met again in late February, 1974, to review developments since the Western Economic Opportunities Conference. In particular, they discussed transportation, agriculture and economic development. Because the Premier of British Columbia has consistently associated himself with his Prairie colleagues since early 1973, the Prairie Economic Council has been renamed the Western Economic Council. It appears that this new body is developing in a manner not dissimilar to that of the Council of Maritime Premiers. Unlike the latter institution, however, there is as yet no formalized liaison between the Western Premiers as a group and a body of Western state Governors.¹⁶

That Canada's formal political institutions are somewhat out of harmony with the society they serve has been apparent for some time, particularly since the early 1960's. During that decade, Maritime and Western alienation from the national political scene has become increasingly pronounced. Unable to focus Ottawa's attention on their particular problems and grievances, political elites in both areas have turned to the building of regional institutions. In particular, Maritime and Western regional coordinating mechanisms and bloc behavior can be linked with the possibility of Quebec's secession from Canada, the perception of continued federal neglect, and intergovernmental conference diplomacy.

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¹⁵ The only survey research reported at the conference was a poll of Albertans of whom only some 23 percent favored one prairie province. See David K. Elton, "Electoral Perceptions of Federalism: A Descriptive Analysis of the Alberta Electorate," in Elton, ed., *One Prairie Province*, p. 145. Another interesting paper was that presented by R. M. Burns who feared the destabilizing effects of a united prairie province on the Canadian federation. See his "Prairie Union—Implications for Canadian Federalism," *ibid.*, pp. 65-73.

¹⁶ For an interesting, though speculative, discussion of the possibilities, however, see Brigham Y. Card, "Political Union, Regionalism or Both?" *ibid.*, pp. 107-32.

Thomas Allen Levy has written "The Involvement of the Provinces in Foreign Relations II," in *The Changing Role of the Diplomatic Function in the Making of Foreign Policy* (Dalhousie University, Occasional Paper, June, 1973) and (in collaboration with Richard H. Leach and Donald E. Walker), "Province-State Transborder Relations: A Preliminary Assessment," in *Canadian Public Administration*, XVI (Fall, 1973).

"... Canadian party politics at the federal level has been characterized not by alternation in office between two major parties but by one-party dominance. . . ."

Canadian Parties and Politics

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EVEN THE MOST CASUAL OBSERVER of Canada is struck by her remarkable social, regional, and economic diversity. This diversity has significantly delayed—if not prevented—national integration, and has always made the task of mobilizing a legislative majority for a political party bent on national power extremely complicated.

Prior to the last 15 or so years, the political parties succeeded in overcoming enough of that diversity to win the popular support necessary to form a majority government in most elections. They were able to do so primarily because while the electorate was complex, it was still simple enough for a kind of formula for electoral success to be available to politicians shrewd enough to be able to follow it. The formula consisted of capturing strong support in one major region—either Quebec or Ontario—and adding enough strength elsewhere for a majority. More often than not, the winning coalition had electoral success in Quebec as its core.

At the same time, Canadian party politics at the federal level¹ has been characterized not by alternation in office between two major parties but by one-party dominance: from confederation in 1867 until 1896—with a five-year break in the 1870's—the Conservatives formed the government in Ottawa. From 1896 until 1911, it was the Liberals' turn. After a Conservative return from 1911 until 1921, the Liberals

took control and, except for a brief interlude in 1926 and between 1930 and 1935, they controlled the government until 1957, when the Conservatives (who added the prefix Progressive to their name in 1942) headed by John Diefenbaker upset them. In that 22-year period from 1935 until 1957, the Liberals won five elections by legislative majorities despite the presence of minor parties—the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), which in 1961 changed its name to the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the Social Credit Party.

Diefenbaker led his party to a record victory in 1958, winning 208 of the 265 seats in the House of Commons. Since then, with the exception of the majority success achieved by the Liberals under Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968, the formula for putting together a national majority no longer seems viable. Partisan instability has characterized Canadian politics in the last 15 years and together with the multi-party situation has produced minority administrations in five of the last seven elections. Aside from the aforementioned majorities achieved by Diefenbaker in 1958 and Trudeau ten years later, Conservatives formed minority governments in 1957 and 1962 as did the Liberals led by Lester Pearson in 1963 and 1965. And the most recent federal election held on October 30, 1972, produced the most inconclusive result Canada has experienced in the 29 general elections since confederation.²

In 1972, with 38.5 percent of the popular vote, the Liberals captured only 109 of the 264 seats in the House of Commons. Four years earlier, they had 45.5 percent support and 155 seats. Meanwhile, the Conservatives increased their strength substantially: they won 35 percent of the vote and 107 seats. In 1968, they had 31.4 percent of the vote and 72 seats. The NDP also did somewhat better in 1972 than in 1968, increasing its popularity from just under 17 percent to 17.7 percent and its seat total from 22 to 31. Social Credit's vote increased slightly but the number of constituencies it won was almost the same:

¹ For a more complete review of political parties and voting behavior in Canada, see J. M. Beck, *Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1968); F. C. Engemann and M. A. Schwartz, *Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1967); John Meisel, *Working Papers on Canadian Politics*, enlarged edition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973); and Peter Regenstreif, *The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada* (Toronto: Longmans, 1965).

² For an intensive analysis of voting patterns in the 1972 election see Peter Regenstreif and Jerome H. Black, "Partisan Stability and Change in the Canadian Federal Election of 1972: Evidence From a National Panel Survey," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, August 19, 1973.

Table I: Percentage of Vote and Number of Seats Won by the Parties Nationally and Regionally in 1972

	National		Atlantic		Quebec		Ontario		Prairies		B.C.	
	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats
Liberals	38.5	109	39.4	10	49.2	56	38.3	36	26.8	3	28.9	4
Conservatives	35.0	107	49.6	32	17.8	2	38.9	40	47.5	34	33.2	8
NDP	17.7	31	8.4	—	6.5	—	21.5	11	22.7	8	34.9	11
Social Credit	7.6	15	2.0	—	23.4	15	.4	—	2.7	—	2.7	—
Others	1.2	2	.5	—	2.8	1	.7	1	.3	—	.3	—

in 1968 it received 4.4 percent support and 14 seats, while in 1972 it had 7.6 percent and 15 seats. The Speaker of the House and one independent were also elected.

The reasons for the inability of the political parties to mobilize national legislative majorities recently are the result of two interrelated forces. First of all, the country has become far more complex in its social composition. The population has expanded both by natural means and by immigration; Canadian society has become more urbanized and industrialized and therefore even more diverse than ever; and communications among and within groups and regions have increased substantially, thereby aiding their political mobilization. Second, public expectations as to the role of government have dramatically expanded. At the turn of the century, federal politicians saw themselves, and were regarded, as responsible for a few commercial and banking regulations, letting contracts for government construction projects and little else. Today, as a result of two great wars and economic depression, governments now oversee, if not actually run, welfare, health and social services, and the massive industrial and economic system.

It was relatively easy to satisfy the principal forces in the electorate in 1900. The Liberals of that day under Sir Wilfrid Laurier projected an image of empathy for the French-Canadian voter—thereby carrying Quebec—while they forged an alliance with the English commercial establishments of Montreal and Toronto, producing sufficient support elsewhere. Later, after the West was opened and when Mackenzie King led the Liberals, some minor attempts to liberalize trade were sufficient to add the allegiance of Western agricultural interests to the earlier coalition.

Today, no such simplistic balancing act appears possible. Aid to consumers in Ontario and Quebec almost certainly alienates agricultural and industrial producers. Attempts to control inflation by reducing the supply of money or by wage and price controls satisfy the consumer but also risk unemployment rates that ultimately prove counterproductive, both to the success of the policy and to the electoral prospects of the government instituting such measures. In short, any initiative or response taken by a government today appears to have as many advantages as disadvantages in the context of modern Canadian society.

THIRD AND FOURTH PARTIES

Moreover, third and fourth parties have emerged because the norms of the parliamentary system and Cabinet government make it especially difficult for individual parties to represent the wide diversity of the Canadian electorate today. A political party may attempt in its public utterances to be all things to all voters but in fact, as soon as it attempts to legislate as a government, it almost invariably alienates some of its supporters. For example, any government trying to control food prices may satisfy its supporters from the urban areas of Ontario and Quebec, but it risks the unhappiness of its members from the Prairies, where the food is produced. The only way these Prairie members can express their dissatisfaction is in private in the caucus. Party solidarity denies them too strident an expression of that dissatisfaction in public; and certainly voting against a government bill in Parliament is impossible because an act risks removing their own party from power. Voters are only too aware of these constraints, and when it becomes clear that their particular interests cannot be represented within the fold of one of the major parties, they switch their support to new groups that promise more adequate representation.

This is how the Progressive movement got underway after World War I. Farmers in Western Ontario and on the Prairies felt their demands for lower tariffs would not be met by either the Conservatives or the Liberals, so in the election of 1921, they elected 64 Progressives to Parliament. It took considerable persuasion, some legislative blandishments, and a great deal of patience by Liberal Minister Mackenzie King to bring some of these Progressives over to his party; by 1930, they had disappeared.

The major parties were not so successful in subverting the third-party movements that followed in the 1930's. The Depression-generated CCF and Social Credit have persisted, albeit in altered form, to this day.

The CCF began in 1933 as a farmer-labor party dedicated to the establishment of socialism in Canada. It elected 7 M.P.'s in the 1935 election, and had as many as 28 M.P.'s in 1945. But in the 1958 election that gave Diefenbaker his record majority, CCF representation was reduced to 8. As a result, it decided to participate with the labor unions in forming the

NDP, which captured around 13 percent of the vote in the 1962 and 1963 elections, increasing its support to 18 percent in 1965, a level it has more or less maintained since. It elected 30 to Parliament in 1962, but its representation was in the low 20's in the other three elections in the 1960's.

By the middle of the 1950's, the socialism of the CCF had been toned down considerably, and the NDP has carried on in that vein. It is now a social-democratic party, with union backing, intent on achieving national power. Not all its adherents have agreed with this style. In the last few years, a group calling itself "The Waffle" emerged within the party. Led by some NDP intellectuals and supported by young university students, it demanded a return to pure socialism. It was so troublesome to the NDP leadership that it was expelled from the party.

The NDP's major sources of electoral strength are found in urban British Columbia, parts of the Prairies, and in urban and Northern Ontario. People who see themselves as members of the working class or who are members of labor unions are also more disposed to vote for them than the rest of the electorate. The New Democrats also receive considerable support from young people, especially from those in universities or university educated.

In provincial politics, the CCF formed the government in Saskatchewan in 1944 under T. C. Douglas, who was later the first leader of the NDP, and continued in power there for 20 years. Today, there are NDP governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, and the party is a strong force in Ontario.

The history of the Social Credit movement has been considerably more erratic than that of the CCF-NDP. A product of the great depression of the 1930's like the CCF, Social Credit originated in Alberta as a nativist movement, scapegoating the monetary and banking system as the cause of the privation of the times. In 1935, 17 Social Credit representatives from Alberta and Saskatchewan were elected to Parliament, and its representation reached 19 in 1957. In that 22-year period, it received no representation east of Saskatchewan. It failed to elect any members in the Diefenbaker landslide in 1958, but it received a new incarnation in 1962 when a Quebec group, the Ralliement des Créditistes, led by Réal Caouette, received the support of 26 percent of the Quebec electorate and sent 26 members to Ottawa. In that election, only four Social Creditors were elected from Western Canada.

Since then, only the Quebec wing of Social Credit has been a force in federal politics. Caouette's appeal has been to the less well-off French Canadians living outside the island of Montreal in the Eastern Townships, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence River and in the northern reaches of the province. In con-

trast to the highly conservative western Social Creditors, Caouette advocates more government involvement in social services, increased family allowances, and old-age pensions and a policy of bilingualism in Ottawa. Social Credit support has fluctuated dramatically throughout the 1960's, dropping as low as 16 percent in 1968, while only nine Créditistes were elected in 1965. Still, Caouette and his group have been the chief obstacle to complete Liberal dominance of the province of Quebec and the fact that Social Credit received 23 percent of the vote in the province, while electing 15 members in 1972 was an important blow to Trudeau in his attempt to have his government returned with a reasonable margin over the opposition.

Provincially, Social Credit controlled the governments of Alberta from 1935 until 1971 and British Columbia from 1952 until 1972. It is the official opposition in both provinces today and has only two representatives out of 110 in the Quebec National Assembly, where the Liberals lead the administration with 101 members.

Despite fluctuations in partisanship and multi-partism, the Liberal party still retains an electoral edge over its opponents. Opinion surveys consistently show anywhere from 33 percent to 38 percent of the population claiming to see themselves as Liberal in replying to questions about their party identification. In contrast, between 25 percent and 28 percent see themselves as Conservatives, approximately 10 percent or 11 percent as New Democrats, and 4 percent as Social Credit. Some 15 percent reject all party identification.

THE ROLE OF QUEBEC

In regional terms, the greatest source of Liberal party strength continues to be Quebec, which, with one or two exceptions, has sustained the party since 1896. At first, it was primarily the overwhelmingly French Canadian population of the province that voted Liberal, motivated first by antipathy to the Conservatives over the Riel affair in 1885 and the obvious Anglophilic, anti-Catholic and anti-French stance of Conservative politicians thereafter. Over time, the Liberal party came to be the only avenue of access to national politics for French Canadians. Three Liberal Prime Ministers have been French Canadian while the Conservatives have not had a major French Canadian figure among their parliamentary notables since World War I, and have had only two Roman Catholics as their leaders in their entire history.

The most recent success achieved by the Conservatives in Quebec came in 1958 when they elected 50 out of 75 members. But that representation was reduced to 14 in 1962 as Social Credit became the major opposition to the Liberals. Conservative support in 1972 in the province was the lowest it has ever been.

With the rise of separatist agitation in the 1960's, and especially with the appearance of the Parti Québécois in Quebec provincial politics in 1967, English Canadians and the numerous minority ethnic groups in the province have supported the Liberals with a far greater intensity than French Canadians. They have been attracted by Prime Minister Trudeau's attacks on the movement and by his actions in the crisis of October, 1970, when terrorists kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross and murdered provincial Deputy Prime Minister Pierre Laporte.

If the Liberals have historically depended on Quebec for support—and never more so than in 1972 when it was the only region where they led their opponents—they have been confronted by the adamant opposition of the three Prairie Provinces since 1957. Prior to that time, the Liberals did reasonably well in the area, receiving considerable support as a result of a relatively open immigration policy (with which the area was settled in the days of Laurier) and because their commercial policies were more favorable to the region than those of the Conservatives.

The advent of Diefenbaker changed allegiances there as the Conservative leader, a Westerner himself, was able to articulate the alienation of the region against central Canada, and by definition, against the Liberals who seemed to personify the neglectful stance toward the Prairies which Westerners attributed to the federal government. Diefenbaker's Conservatives won all but 1 of the 48 seats in the region in 1958, and throughout the 1960's they were the dominant party there, easily supplanting both the CCF and Social Credit. Even in 1968, when Trudeau was bringing his party its only federal majority since 1953 and Robert Stanfield had replaced Diefenbaker as Conservative leader, the Conservatives had substantially greater support there than the Liberals. Four years later, they were overwhelmingly in charge once again.

There has been almost no support for third-party candidates in the Atlantic region—except for the election of a lone CCF'er in Nova Scotia's Cape Breton South from 1940 until 1957. In both 1968 and 1972, the fact that Stanfield was formerly Premier of Nova Scotia helped give his Conservatives a solid lead over the Liberals. In contrast, British Columbia was the scene of wild fluctuations in partisanship, with four parties vying for support throughout most of the 1960's. In 1968, the Liberals won 16 of the province's 23 seats, shutting out the Conservatives and leaving the NDP with only 7, as voters there responded to Trudeau's powerful personal appeal in much the same way as they had responded to Diefenbaker in 1958, when his party won 18 of the province's 22 seats, while the CCF had only 4.

But in 1972, the Conservatives bounced back, winning 8 seats with 33 percent of the vote, while the NDP had 11 seats, with a slightly greater proportion of sup-

port, and the Liberals were reduced to 4 members.

THE 1972 ELECTION

The really remarkable aspect of the 1972 election was the strong showing of the Conservatives in Ontario. The province had been crucial to the 1962 Liberal comeback from the Diefenbaker cataclysm of 1958, and the party received more support from Ontario than Quebec in the elections of 1962, 1963 and 1968. Toronto, once regarded as the bastion of Toryism, was a Liberal stronghold, and elected no Conservatives in 1963, 1965 and 1968. If any region has personified the Liberal style in recent years it is Ontario. The party organization is controlled by people from Ontario, and it reflects the province's urban and urbane tastes. However, the Conservatives reversed the Liberal trend in 1972, increasing their showing by 6 percentage points and their parliamentary representation by 23, managing to elect 5 members from Toronto in the process.

Despite the closeness of the 1972 outcome, the major parties continue to be distinguished by different styles and social support. The Conservatives, reflecting their regional base, draw a considerable portion of their strength from small towns and rural areas, and from Protestants and older people. In contrast, the Liberals are heavily supported by French Canadians, young people, the better educated—especially those with university training—and urban dwellers. Having controlled the federal administration for many years, they tend to reflect the mentality of the Ottawa bureaucrats and the national economic elite which is so closely tied to them. Accordingly, they tend to see the country from the perspective of Central Canada and to neglect some of the regional nuances of their policies. Over the years, the Liberals have also come to regard themselves as the natural rulers of the country and it was this arrogance of power rather than any particular deficiencies in their policies that led to their near defeat in the 1972 election.

While the Conservatives mounted an intensive issue-oriented campaign, focusing on public discontent about unemployment, inflation, high taxes and misuse of welfare, the Liberals behaved as if no issues were important, seeming to believe that it was unnecessary to defend their policies of the previous four years or to project a program for the future.

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"When ecological issues are put aside, the debate over development in the North tends to focus upon the question of who should profit from resource exploitation. . . . What safeguards will be undertaken to protect the interests and land of the native people?"

Native Minorities and Ethnic Conflict in Canada

BY JEAN LEONARD ELLIOTT

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ETHNIC CONFLICT IN CANADA is not new. Since her inception as a nation in 1867, Canada's existence has depended upon the maintenance of an uneasy alliance between English-speaking Canada and French-speaking Quebec. In addition to the tensions implicit in the political reality of *les deux nations*, immigrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds continue to pour into Canada in numbers significant enough to contribute to the overall growth rate. It is estimated that one out of every three Canadians is either a new Canadian or from an ethnic group other than French or English.

Perhaps in recognition of the potential conflict inherent in this multiplicity of ethnic groups as well as for other less expedient motives, the current Liberal government headed by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau has developed a multicultural program; it supplements the federal government's previous attempts at nurturing biculturalism.¹ Thus in the late 1960's Canada came to embrace bilingualism—the two official languages are English and French—with the context of a multicultural nation.

In spite of well intentioned multiculturalism, ethnic conflict is nascent in some regions of Canada and at times threatens to become overt. In Quebec, one particular issue has an old familiar ring to it inasmuch as it does not involve a new immigrant group, but concerns the Quebecois and some English-speaking Canadians. In this instance, however, *les anglais* are 6,000 Cree Indians and a few Eskimo (Inuit)

inhabiting the James Bay region in the northern part of the province near Fort George.

As was historically the case in the United States, the primary conflict between the Indians and the European settlers in Canada could be traced to westward expansion; the Indians were displaced as settlement progressed from the East to the Plains and later to the Pacific. The land was coveted for railroad construction, farming, cattle grazing and town settlement. Mineral extraction was of secondary importance and was a minor source of hostilities, with the possible exception of the gold rush in the late nineteenth century in such places as the Yukon and California. Today, however, because of the "energy crisis," in the face of overwhelming odds, the Canadian native peoples are engaged in a last-ditch attempt to preserve their way of life on the last frontier—the Canadian North. Pipeline construction, river diversion for hydroelectric projects, and the frantic exploration for oil and other minerals in the Arctic threaten the aboriginal cultures as basically as did the spread of "civilization" on the rest of the continent. History is repeating itself, and this time there is little land available for a retreat.

The Quebec situation is complicated by the fact that the enemy of the Cree and Inuit is not simply the province; the "enemy" encompasses the entire eastern United States and its insatiable energy needs. The mammoth hydroelectric project in the James Bay area will result in the flooding of thousands of square miles of land, land on which the aboriginal people are dependent for trapping, hunting, and fishing. According to some ecologists, however, the native people are not the only potential losers. Interference with the ecosystem of the James Bay region could have profound implications for the flora, fauna, and climate of North America.

Quebec is adamant in its refusal to delay develop-

¹ This attempt resulted in the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Volume 4 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pays tribute to groups other than the French and English. The native people are not included in this effort. The First Canadian Conference on Multi-Culturalism was held in Ottawa in October, 1973; native people participated.

ment until the land claims of the native people of the James Bay area have been settled in the courts and until dissident ecologists give approval. In order more fully to comprehend Quebec's stand, it is essential to have an understanding of the prior French/Indian conflict as well as the internal strife which has characterized Quebec and its position in the Canadian federation. That is the inspiration, and defense of the James Bay development, it appears, involves more than a desire to profiteer from the energy crisis.

QUEBEC'S QUIET REVOLUTION

The Quiet Revolution in Quebec refers to a series of events in the early 1960's concurrent with the end of the Maurice Duplessis era and the rise of the Liberal party government of Jean Lesage. Central among these events was the combined process of urbanization and industrialization. As Quebec became urban and secular, a bourgeoisie white collar class was formed, one generation removed from its rural origins. The new white collar class was modern in outlook and proudly nationalistic within the bounds of federalism. In the last provincial election in Quebec in the fall of 1973, the Liberal party continued to consolidate its strong hold in the province running on the familiar *maitre chez nous* platform, the underlying assumption being that autonomy would be achieved within the context of a strong federal Canada.

Traditionally, the separatist party, the Parti Québécois, has drawn what little support it could muster from intellectuals and disenchanted urban workers. Although the Parti Québécois currently constitutes the official opposition party in Quebec, fear of economic disequilibrium and the recognition of an inevitable need to renegotiate economic ties with Canada if Quebec were to become a separate nation state have tended to keep separatist support from gaining momentum. On an emotional level, the notion of separatism, a Quebec *libre*, may have vast appeal to the Quebecois electorate, but the province remains unconvinced that it would provide a workable alternative to confederation. It is doubtful that a Quebec separate from Canada could be born without an initial decrease in the standard of living and much economic hardship for many—at least in the transition phase. In the rural areas, separatist sentiment is slight. The party of Maurice Duplessis, the Union Nationale, along with other minor parties, have some adherents, but they are not separatist in phi-

losophy and are not forces to be taken seriously in the province as a whole.

The poor showing at the ballot boxes for separatism in the recent provincial election should not be interpreted to mean, however, that the Quebecois are apathetic on the subject of Quebec nationalism or that it is merely a romantic dream. Nothing could be further from the truth. While protecting the rights of the English language minority in Quebec, the Quebec Liberal government of Henri Bourassa has made strides in making French the working language of the province; the French Canadian has become increasingly more visible in the public sector in positions within government ministries, the Canadian Broadcasting Company, the federal civil service, and the Armed Forces. Quebec has also become aware of the necessity of asserting economic control over resource and industrial development. An example of domestic control over resource development is provided by Quebec Hydro, the provincially owned power utility and the largest French language employer in Quebec, employing almost exclusively Quebecois engineers and technocrats.²

HYDRO QUEBEC

Hydro Quebec is the symbol of contemporary Quebec and the new nationalism which it embodies. It is a highly successful French effort. Quebecers point to it with pride as it represents the achievement of a unified Quebec. Previous to the Quiet Revolution, power utilities were privately owned and Quebecois were underrepresented in managerial and technical jobs throughout the province. Jobs at the foreman level and above typically were filled by English-speaking Canadians, Americans or British; this job pattern reflected the source of the development capital and the branch plant nature of Quebec's economy. Educated Quebecois were a small elite tending to choose careers in the professions, shying away from engineering and technical studies. The Quebec classical colleges provided a fine background for would-be priests and lawyers, but not for civil engineers.

The James Bay Development Corporation (JBDC) is an off-shoot of Hydro Quebec. Some say it was created to counter the impression that Hydro was becoming too powerful and assuming the dimensions of a state within a state.³ Regardless of the political conditions surrounding its origin, JBDC is responsible for a new colonial administration in the North. Needless to say, the native peoples were not included on the executive board or consulted in the initial planning phase of the project. Aside from the physical presence of the JBDC, it is a legal fiction as well, and the native peoples must cope with it while at the same time confronting the main figures and offices of the provincial and federal governments.

² Hydro Quebec is financed in part by foreign capital. See Richard C. Bocking, *Canada's Water: For Sale?* (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1972).

³ This opinion and historical background are provided by Philip Sykes, *Sellout: the Giveaway of Canada's Energy Resources* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973), especially pp. 180-182.

Ecological concerns as well as concerns directly voiced by the native people about the threat to their traditional way of life have been given short shrift by the Bourassa government. Perfunctory ecological studies have been commissioned by Quebec, but all negative findings tend to be dismissed, especially those presented by unsympathetic outsiders. This point is illustrated by the hostile reception in Quebec which the American Sierra Club-sponsored book, *The Plot to Drown the North Woods*, received.⁴ The Quiet Revolution is apparently still too young to have its basic competence or ethical integrity thrown into question. To doubt the wisdom of Hydro is, in effect, to question the legitimacy of the new Quebec. It is a sign of maturity perhaps when a government can open its doors to its critics and invite them in to review procedures and policy positions. With respect to James Bay, this openness has not yet characterized the Quebec Liberal government.

ETHNIC CONFLICT

In addition to such matters as French nationalism and aboriginal land claims, which make the diverse ecological findings hard to sort out, the James Bay development is colored by ethnic conflict; this hostility makes the situation all the more difficult to resolve. The Cree Indians are English-speaking Anglicans who were converted by Anglican missionaries. There has never been a close working relationship between the native people and the province. The animosity between the French Catholic and the Anglican, English-speaking Cree is a longstanding conflict, carried over from the past to influence the present.

⁴ Boyce Richardson, *James Bay: The Plot to Drown the North Woods* (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972). Richardson is a Montreal writer. Bourassa announced the James Bay project in April, 1971. The first preliminary ecological study was undertaken in the following months. (See Joint Federal-Provincial Task Force, *A Preliminary Study of the Environmental Impacts of the James Bay Project*, December 20, 1971). The first impartial study involving actual field work took place in 1972. J. A. Spence and G. C. Spence, *Ecological Considerations of the James Bay Project*; a report prepared for the U.N. Conference on Human Environment, April, 1972.

⁵ "James Bay power project is 'French-English Warfield,'" *The Calgary Herald*, January 2, 1974, p. 22. For the main research behind these comments, see Richard F. Salisbury, F. Fernand, F. Rawji and D. Stewart, *Development and James Bay: Social Implications of the Proposals for the Hydroelectric Scheme*; a report prepared by Department of Anthropology at McGill University for the James Bay Development Corporation, June, 1972. The JBDC controls physical access to the area. It is interesting to note that Quebec allowed the English-speaking McGill University to enter the area with a team of anthropologists.

⁶ Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 191. The opposition party, le Parti Québécois, favors the exploration of nuclear power as a possible alternative to the James Bay Project. (Parti Québécois. Dossier: L'Affaire de la Baie James, 1972.) See also, W. Paskievici, "D'ici 1980, les centrales nucléaires seront devenues les plus économiques," *Le Devoir*, April 13, 1972.

There is also a racial dimension to the conflict, in that the rhetoric used in discussion often attributes superiority to the culture of the Quebecois and inferiority to *les sauvages*. Genocide is not too emphatic a term to describe one possible outcome for the native people of the James Bay Project.

While the vast majority in Quebec are solidly behind the Liberal government and the JBDC, it should be mentioned that the James Bay issue has received some coverage in the mass media. The opposition party has tried in vain to point out the folly of the operation and folk heroes such as chansonier Gilles Vigneault have staged mass gatherings in opposition to the plans of the JBDC. In spite of this internal French opposition, an anthropologist, Richard Salisbury, estimates that three out of four people in Quebec support the project; supporters tend to identify the opposition as consisting of "English-speaking social scientists, ecologists, and a few radicals."⁵

Opposition also comes from economists—both English-speaking and those outside the Liberal party camp. In order to finance the project, Quebec has had to look outside Canada for investment capital and markets. The provision of hydro-electric power at economical rates to Canadians has been a second-order concern and one that may not be forthcoming. Some economists estimate that the James Bay power project will be a disastrous undertaking, contributing to inflation at home, with energy commitments made to New England and New York state without thought for domestic needs. Worse yet is the prediction in some quarters that Consolidated Edison, for example, will convert to nuclear energy, leaving the JBDC in the lurch.⁶ Taking a narrow and immediate view of the situation, the Bourassa government attempts to console itself by looking at the employment figures associated with the power project.

Quebec responds to its detractors by reminding them of the success of the Churchill Falls development project in Labrador, which was a Hydro undertaking. Also in Hydro's defense is the fact that water is a renewable resource; the exportation of power derived from the harnessing of this resource is not so serious a "crime against Canada" as the exportation of a non-renewable resource such as oil. Self-righteously and correctly, Quebec points out that, unlike energy produced by nuclear fission or the burning of fossil fuels, no pollutant results; thus hydroelectric power has an obvious ecological advantage which all those who are concerned with the state and preservation of the environment should favor.

With respect to native land claims, Quebec assures the rest of Canada and the natives of its willingness to find a settlement agreeable to all concerned. Quebec testily denies that it is attempting to be a power broker in the energy crisis, or that it is putting its own economic and nationalistic concern above those

of the native people and the ecology of the continent as a whole.

The existence of aboriginal rights has not been legally established to the satisfaction of the native people of Canada. Aboriginal rights are those land rights which native people retain as a result of their original occupancy and traditional use of the lands. Large areas of the North have never been included in negotiated treaties.

In 1969, the federal government might have dodged the matter of aboriginal rights entirely with a new Indian policy which proposed to repeal the Indian Act and render the treaties obsolete. It was argued that treaties by their very nature were discriminatory, because it was an anomaly to have treaties between groups within a society. The policy sought to "end the legal distinction between Indians and other Canadians."⁷ Seductive though this sentiment may be, the policy was rejected outright by the Indians in much the same manner that a similar "termination policy" in the United States was defeated.

The Indians were unwilling to scrap the treaties in the hope of gaining a more equitable definition of their status vis à vis the larger society. On the contrary, they believed that the treaties and land claims were the only real leverage which could be brought to bear on the larger society in their struggle to maintain their land and their cultural heritage. *Land is the key to the understanding of the Indian point of view;* this is especially true in the James Bay case.

The unfortunate stereotype pictures the Indian living in destitution on a reserve or existing in an urban skid row on social welfare. Instead, native settlements in the La Grande River area are economically and socially healthy. Isolated until the invasion of the JBDC, the Indian and Inuit have been able to hunt, trap, and fish, and are adequately sustained by their traditional way of life.⁸ In the context of their present life-style, both cash settlements and the promise of a new legal definition of what it means to be an Indian in Canada are worthless to them. Without their land and a guarantee of environmental protection, such a phrase as "cultural heritage" becomes an empty cliché.

The legal context of the struggle is complicated by the fact that treaties affect only half the Indians of Canada. Most of the Indians of Quebec, British Columbia, and the Yukon have not signed treaties,

⁷ *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

⁸ Salisbury, et. al., *op. cit.* See also Harvey A. Feit, "L'ethno-écologie des cris waswanipis, ou comment des chasseurs peuvent aménager leurs ressources," *Bulletin d'information, Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, December, 1971.

⁹ Under the authority of Head 24, Section 91 of the British North American Act, the Parliament of Canada enacted the Indian Act. The BNA Act is similar in its function to the American constitution.

but all Indians fall under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act.⁹ The status of Indians is considered a federal matter; the actual administration of the native people is the responsibility of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Given the federal government's responsibility toward the Indians and the fact that the terms of the treaties which do exist vary from area to area, it has been necessary for Indians to organize on a national, territorial, and provincial level. The National Indian Brotherhood is the over-arching organization which coordinates efforts with provincial groups like the Indians of Quebec Association (IQA). The National Brotherhood and the provincial associations are funded in the main by the federal government.

The struggle of the native people may be hampered somewhat by the fact that they are still new at organizing and must rely upon the goodwill and integrity of non-Indian professionals to push their case in the courts and often in the public forum. Very few native people are university educated, and the Indian associations have been in existence less than a decade. Added to this "newness" is the persistence of regional and tribal loyalties which may tend to work against the development of a pan-Indian consciousness. In aboriginal times, the Indian and Inuit were separated by geography, language, and culture; these aboriginal distinctions exist to some extent today and add to the divisive legal fictions which describe Indians as registered on a reserve or non-registered, treaty or non-treaty, and full blood or half breed (Metis). The Inuit have never had their land designated as a reserve and have not engaged in treaties with the federal or territorial government. Yet they are also subject to language and cultural differences; they are fewer in number than the Indians and are more isolated in the vast terrain of the Arctic.

Native people all over Canada are waiting expectantly for the final disposition of the James Bay court case. It is of particular interest, however, to the James Bay Indians in Ontario. The James Bay treaty (Treaty No. 9) was signed in 1905 with the federal and Ontario governments. The benefits from this treaty have been meager, especially with respect to what the Quebec Indians stand to gain, even if they should lose on some of the larger issues involved.

The Quebec government's negotiations with the Indians have been prompted by necessity rather than by any formal recognition of aboriginal rights. The IQA asserts that the Quebec government is "trespassing," and there are grounds for this accusation. In fact, the IQA case was sufficient enough for the Quebec Superior Court to grant the Indians a temporary injunction in November, 1973, ordering all work on the \$6-billion project stopped. When the Quebec Court of Appeal suspended the injunction a week later, it acted on the grounds that the interests of the

people of Quebec outweighed the interests of the Indians involved.¹⁰ The matter of aboriginal rights, however, hangs in abeyance; it has yet to be ruled upon by the Quebec Court of Appeal or by the Supreme Court of Canada.

It is clear, however, that Quebec has been remiss in the past with respect to the correct procedure outlined by the federal government concerning the acquisition of native lands. Quebec's English-speaking neighbor, Ontario, is a paragon of virtue in this regard, having made treaty with the James Bay Indians when the territory became part of Ontario in 1912. That same year, the territory upon which the power plant is being constructed became part of Quebec, and Quebec was obliged to follow Ontario's practice with respect to the recognition and surrender of rights. Since the legal case so strongly favors the IQA, it is believed that the Bourassa government will be inclined to push for a settlement outside of the courts. Serious negotiations with the IQA began only after the temporary injunction had halted work on the project. That is, no meaningful dialogue with the Indians took place before the actual construction of highways, airstrips, ports, and towns began as preliminary work which will lead to the eventual construction of four giant dams on the La Grande river.

The IQA has stressed repeatedly that a financial settlement is not primary in its concerns; neither is it totally opposed to all "development." Development in the area is already on such a grand scale that soon the whole issue will be a moot point. There are 3,600 workmen in the area, and the nearest airport at Matagami is handling 10,000 flights a month; it is expected soon to surpass the activity of every other airport in the country. Metagami is the distribution point for shipments to the James Bay project.¹¹

It is a safe bet that the settlement of the James Bay case will be in the nature of a compromise. There will be some modification of the dam construction although perhaps not sufficient modification to protect the environment. There will be a cash offer as well as some token involvement of the native people in the JBDC. Perhaps they will be granted a share of the development revenue. And there will no doubt be verbal assurances that the environment will not be degraded. It is predicted that there will be much haggling over the knotty land question. To date, the Bourassa government has made an offer of reserve land and the IQA has maintained that it is not the province's to offer in the first instance. What

any settlement will overlook, however, are the far-reaching and irreparable socio-cultural effects which the JBDC has had already on such towns as Fort George.

To date, what has "progress" meant for the native people? Progress in Fort George means that canoes and snowmobiles are stolen when previously it was safe to leave them unguarded. Native women are treated as "fair game" by workmen, the vast majority of whom are in the North temporarily and without wives. The JBDC serves as a de facto police force and government unit which, of course, is unsympathetic and ignorant concerning the native life-style. Fort George, in essence, has become a company town, and this bears some resemblance to other company towns in the North.

With the rise of a frontier boom town, natives in small numbers have been lured into low-wage employment and have become forever dependent upon a cash economy involving the purchase of such essentials as food. The dependency of natives on wage employment may not have been fully recognized by such projects as the DEWLINE. When a company pulls up stakes and moves on, or, in the case of the JBDC, when it finishes its construction phase in 1980, it may be assumed that the native can return to a life "on the land." It is not realized, however, that this is impossible, because of both ecological and social considerations. More often, no long-term consideration is paid to the plight of the native when so-called development schemes are undertaken. Commonly, the Indians and Eskimo are viewed as backward, superfluous, or, at best, quaint. The prevailing attitude is "the only good native is an employed native."

Significant as the events in the James Bay case are for the future of the native people and the ecology of the continent, nevertheless James Bay is merely a microcosm of the problems and issues which Canada should be confronting in the development of the North. The fact that the JBDC is in Quebec simply means that the political and emotional issue of French Canadian nationalism has befogged many fundamental and universal concerns.

One fundamental issue concerns whether or not development should take place at all, given the permafrost and the fragile nature of the biotic environment of the Arctic. This question has been posed for example, with respect to the controversial Mackenzie Valley pipeline.¹² Inevitable seepage of oil would permanently blight the landscape. The

(Continued on page 183)

¹⁰ "Bay Cash Settlement Will Have Far-reaching Results," *Montreal Star*, January 17, 1974, p. C1.

¹¹ "Quebec Told to Halt James Bay Project," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, November 16, 1973, p. 1.

¹² A thorough discussion of this issue is provided by Robert Page, "The Image of the North," in *Getting It Back: Policies for Canadian Independence*, (eds.), A. Rotstein and G. Lax (Toronto: Clarke Irwin [in press]).

Jean L. Elliott is the editor of volume one of *Minority Canadians* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971), and is the author of numerous articles in books and journals on the problems of minority groups.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE MIDDLE EAST, OIL AND THE GREAT POWERS. BY BENJAMIN SHWADRAN. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. 630 pages, bibliography and index, \$27.50.)

Benjamin Shwadran has produced a lengthy and instructive story of Middle East oil and the great powers. Most of the book was written before the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and before the energy crisis it helped to create in many nations of the world. Nevertheless, Shwadran's conclusions are remarkable for their timeliness and have been proved accurate in the events of the last six months.

Shwadran feels that the "Middle East is, and more likely will remain for some time to come, the greatest oil producer, and contains the greatest ordinary oil reserves in the world. . . . The entire Western world, especially the United States, is in a state of panic—open and unconcealed—over future energy supplies." Shwadran believes that the price structure with regard to oil, whether established by oil companies or by oil-producing countries, has always been determined at the expense of the consumer. As he sees it, the oil companies can go along with the producing countries and continue to increase the price structure at the expense of the consumer (and probably insure a continued source of oil for the next decade). On the other hand, the oil companies could agree to full nationalization, joining the consumers as purchasers of Middle East oil in a free market and thus producing a sane balance in the world's future energy, financial and investment patterns. To meet the threat of controlled production, all consumer countries would have to develop alternatives to Middle East oil. This would help free the consumer nations from absolute dependence on Middle East oil; otherwise the "mutuality of interest would be heavily weighted against the Western countries." In view of what has happened to the consumer countries of the world since this book was published in late 1973, Shwadran's conclusions are well worth considering.

O.E.S.

THE ATLAS OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

Prepared and published by *Jeune Afrique*, under the direction of Regine Van Chi-Bonnardel. (New York: The Free Press, 1974. 335 pages, glossary, index of geographic terms and index, \$80.00.)

Under the direction of Regine Van Chi-Bonnardel of the University of Paris, a team of geographers, cartographers and economists produced this new and handsome atlas of Africa after five

years of work. The colored maps of the giant-size volume are handsomely executed.

O.E.S.

BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ 1947-1968. BY PHILLIP DARBY. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973. 366 pages, selected bibliography and index, £6.50.)

Phillip Darby has given us a "study of the evolution of a structure of power which was originally built round the defense of India into a system of mobile forces designed to maintain stability round the rim of the Indian Ocean." The territory covered by this book is actually much larger than the Indian Ocean; it runs from Egypt all the way to Australia. Once India became independent, Britain no longer needed to be India's defender, and new concepts of Britain's future role in this large region of the world evolved.

Darby offers an in-depth study of the manner in which British military doctrine developed in the years from 1947 to 1968. He feels that political leadership was lacking for the most part, and that the armed forces gave the most effective guidance and help to the new states of Africa and Asia. The lengthy bibliography makes this book extremely valuable for the student.

O.E.S.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION.

BY JAMES BARROS and DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON. (New York: The Free Press, 1974. 476 pages and index, \$12.95.)

This is a scholarly collection of materials for teaching the international law of pollution prevention. "Since pollution can be traced to many causes, some of which are political and highly emotional, its solution will not come easily. Most pollution problems are further complicated by the fact that merely national approaches . . . are too limited to assure lasting assurance of prevention and control . . . and must be treated within a modern system of international law. . . ." The authors have selected definitions, legal cases, and opinions to show the scope of the problems confronting the nations of the world in the twentieth century.

Just one example: where does the responsibility rest in case of nuclear accident to a naval vessel employing nuclear power for propulsion and energy? The international law of pollution seems to need urgent research.

O.E.S.

DEVELOPING REGIONALISM

(Continued from page 172)

There are some similarities and some differences between the integrative efforts in the Maritimes and the West. All the Premiers are roughly the same age; in addition, the Maritimers are graduates of the Dalhousie University Law School (as is the Nova Scotia-born Premier of Saskatchewan). Three of their four Western colleagues head NDP administrations. On the other hand, the Maritimers have a greater sense of community; they remain wards of the federal government; and they have the most to lose from the possible political disintegration of Canada. For these reasons, the Maritimers have gone further down the road toward regional integration and carefully refrain from public anti-Ottawa posturing. Moreover, eventual political union of the region poses no noticeable threat to the federal government. Indeed, Ottawa seems to favor Maritime union the better to administer its regional development programs. By contrast, the West could fare quite well economically as an independent state,¹⁷ and tendencies toward Western political unity are a cause of real concern in the federal capital.

It should not be assumed, however, that the Maritimes and the West are monolithic political blocs. In each case, there are intra-regional differences with regard to socio-economic makeup, historical traditions, patterns of public opinion and voting behavior, and particular issues. For example, at the Federal-Provincial First Ministers' Energy Conference held in Ottawa on January 22 and 23, 1974, Saskatchewan and Alberta, with support from Newfoundland, were ranged against the other provinces and the federal government. The Maritimers participated on the basis of a joint position prepared by their Premiers' Council, however.

The new regionalism in the Maritimes and the West does not necessarily portend the fragmentation of the Canadian polity. Nevertheless, the existence of embryonic region-wide institutions is compatible with any of these possible constitutional options: the status quo, regional political unity within the existing constitution, regional political unity in an altered constitution, regional political unity and political independence (with or without a confederal relationship to the rest of Canada or what remains of it), and regional political unity and absorption by the United States. Finally, because these regions sometimes emulate the aggressive political behavior previously associated with Quebec, and because their respective regional institutions are, after all, new phe-

nomena on the Canadian political landscape, they merit continuing attention and study.

NATIVE MINORITIES

(Continued from page 181)

development of the Athabasca Tar Sands will run similar environmental pollution risks as well. Sulphur dioxide would be discharged from the oil refining process, and tons of processed sands would constitute a disposal problem. As in the case of James Bay, grandiose development schemes are announced before politically unbiased and exhaustive environmental impact studies are made and their findings digested.

When ecological issues are put aside, the debate over development in the North tends to focus upon the question of who should profit from resource exploitation. A recent federal/provincial conference in Canada was devoted to this issue: to what extent are resources subject to the ownership and control of a province and to what extent is this wealth held in common by all Canadians? A related issue concerns the acquisition of foreign capital to permit the exploitation of mineral resources and the export commitments which acceptance of this capital entails.¹⁸

Finally, there is a third issue, which is usually given the least attention because it relates to a heretofore powerless minority, the native people of Canada. What safeguards will be undertaken to protect the interests and land of the native people? Ecological concerns tie in directly, of course, with the protection of the Indian's and Inuit's traditional economy and life-style. The ecologists are the natural allies of the native peoples, but the native peoples' interests extend beyond the fundamental issue of environment conservation. That is, what should the role of the native people be in the development which seems inevitable and is currently in progress?¹⁹

Peter Usher's field work in the native community of Sachs Harbour on Banks Island in the North West Territories provides ample documentation of the destruction of an economically viable hunting and trapping life-style and the degradation of the environment as the result of oil exploration.¹⁵ Concerning

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¹⁷ Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, *An Energy Policy for Canada, Phase I—Analysis*, July, 1973. Criticism of government policy is presented in *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada*, Gary Teeple (ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

¹⁸ The Alaskan settlement netted the native people \$500 million in cash, a two percent share in the profits on oil and gas production up to another \$500 million, and 10 million acres of land.

¹⁹ Peter J. Usher, *The Bankslanders: Economy and Ecology of a Frontier Trapping Community* (Northern Science Research Group, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).

¹⁷ See John Barr and Owen Anderson, eds., *The Unfinished Revolt: Some Views on Western Independence* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971).

CANADA'S LAST FRONTIER

(Continued from page 164)

are ill-equipped to deal with Western-style development. Development of the North will take place—there is no doubt about that. But to be successful, this development must not only be profitable in capitalistic terms but also in social and environmental terms. There must be a place for northern peoples in this development, and excessive damages to the fragile northern environment must be avoided. In addition, much needed resources must reach the industries of Canada and other countries to keep the industrial economy going. Just how all of this can be achieved and what trade-offs are necessary represent the real challenges of Canada's last frontier.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY

(Continued from page 166)

uary 1, 1974, indexed all incomes for tax purposes, so that the increment in incomes due to price increases will not be taxed at higher marginal tax rates, as was hitherto the case.

Second, the government has tried to increase welfare payments to the poor whenever the "cause" of inflation could be linked to a shift in a micro-component of supply or demand. However, since the government does not possess the tools to do that job properly, it is debatable whether that objective has been achieved. To make that policy effective would require imaginative thinking—a commodity in very short supply in the bureaucracy.

In conclusion, the more important macro-problems of the Canadian economy are related in no small way to what appears to be a systematic mismanagement of the economy by the Department of Finance of the government of Canada and by the Bank of Canada. To be more specific, the mix of monetary and fiscal policy is far from being an optimal one. For example, in the face of an economy that has been operating below its potential for many years, the government has been running fiscal surpluses every year, systematically underestimating the revenues that it would collect. These surpluses have been a deflationary force in the economy and, more than once in the recent past, have killed an emerging boom. At the same time, and in particular over the last two or three years, the Central Bank has been increasing the money supply at rates in the neighborhood of 15 percent per year, partially undoing the harm that the fiscal surpluses would have done, but with deplorable impacts on exchange and interest rates.

This mix of policy has been typical of Canada's economy for 20 years. Why this is so is a mystery that will have to be understood if the economy is to per-

form as well as it could and if recurrent affirmations that "old-fashioned" monetary and fiscal policies do not operate efficiently under the "new" conditions are to be silenced.

CANADIAN PARTIES AND POLITICS

(Continued from page 176)

Since the election, the Trudeau government has been getting by in the House of Commons with NDP support. In order to keep this support, the Prime Minister has been forced to shift his party's legislative course from its path of the previous four years. Between 1968 and 1972, he followed a restrictive fiscal policy in an attempt to curtail inflation and succeeded in increasing unemployment without significantly affecting the high cost of living. He also failed to introduce legislation dealing with election expenses or to attempt to cope with the increasing Americanization of Canadian industry. But since October, 1972, this restrictive economic policy has given way to a concern for the less advantaged. Old age pensions have been increased; so have family allowances. An election expenses bill has been passed into law. Special procedures and an agency have been set up to oversee and perhaps to prevent American takeovers of Canadian enterprises of any substantial size. The NDP, led by David Lewis, has also prevented the Liberals from removing the freeze in the price of Western oil and has compelled them to make a commitment to direct government involvement in the production and distribution of energy.

It is difficult to know what to make of Liberal attempts to please the NDP, except that this is the price the government is prepared to pay to stay in power. The Liberals and New Democrats seem far from a coalition, however, and, at the same time, the Conservatives do not appear to be isolated by the legislative cooperation between their two opponents. In fact, if anything, the Conservatives occasionally appear to be favoring an even greater role for government than either the NDP or the Liberals. During the past year, they have consistently advocated a program of wage and price controls to check the spiralling cost of living, while the Liberals and the NDP have been reluctant to adopt such measures.

While in the opinion polls there is little evidence of any significant changes in public support for the parties, the closeness of the standings in the House could bring on an election at any time. The Prime Minister seems to be disposed to avoid an election as long as he can, and the NDP appears prepared to allow him to do so as long as he does its bidding. But whenever another election is called, it is unlikely that there will be much of a change from the pattern of partisanship of the last few years.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of February, 1974, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Conference of Oil-Consuming Nations

Feb. 11—U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger delivers the opening address to the 13-nation energy conference in Washington. He proposes a 7-point program—Project Interdependence—for cooperation to ameliorate the energy crisis and to safeguard international economic stability.

Feb. 12—The energy conference suspends its work while France and her 8 Common Market allies discuss their differences on how to respond to the U.S. plea for cooperation in dealing with the energy crisis.

Feb. 13—at the energy conference in Washington, the U.S. and other oil-consuming nations issue a final communiqué interspersed with French demurrs, announcing agreement on the need for a comprehensive and cooperative effort to deal with the world energy crisis.

Disarmament

Feb. 19—in Geneva, Soviet and American delegates resume their meeting on limiting strategic arms (the SALT talks) after a 3-month recess.

International Bank For Reconstruction and Development

Feb. 21—the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, pledges more than \$1 billion toward the creation of a new development fund, backed by oil money, to ease problems for the poorer countries caused by higher oil prices.

International Monetary Crisis

Feb. 26—in London, the price of gold reaches a high of \$184 an ounce and then returns to \$175 an ounce. In Paris, the price of gold reaches \$188 an ounce.

Islamic Conference

(See also *Pakistan*)

Feb. 23—the Islamic conference, a meeting of 38 Muslim nations, issues a resolution denouncing U.S. support of Israel and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories.

Bangladesh, having been officially recognized by Pakistan, agrees to send a delegation to the conference.

Latin America

Feb. 21—U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger addresses the opening session of a 3-day conference of 24 Latin American and Caribbean foreign ministers; he calls for the creation of a new "Western Hemisphere community" of nations.

Feb. 23—the Mexico City conference issues a joint resolution, the Declaration of Tlatelolco, proclaiming a "new relationship," based on continuing discussion of issues, between the rich and poor nations of the hemisphere.

Middle East

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 2—3 terrorists, members of a group called "Muslim International Guerrillas," seize a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi, Pakistan; they threaten to blow it up and kill 2 hostages unless the Greek government releases 2 Arab terrorists sentenced to death.

Feb. 3—On the Golan Heights and along the Israeli-Syrian front, Israeli and Syrian forces fire on each other.

2 hostages held on a Greek ship in Karachi are released after Arab terrorists are promised that the death sentences on 2 Arabs will be lifted.

Feb. 6—a guerrilla group of 5 Palestinians seizes the Japanese ambassador to Kuwait and several of his staff; they demand the release of 4 other guerrillas (trapped on a ferryboat seized in Singapore) and their free passage to Kuwait.

Feb. 8—the Kuwait government yields to Japan's plea to allow 4 guerrillas—2 Arabs and 2 Japanese—to fly to Kuwait from Singapore in exchange for the release of Japanese diplomats held in Kuwait.

All 9 Palestinian guerrillas fly to Southern Yemen from Kuwait after releasing the Japanese hostages.

Feb. 13—the official Libyan press agency reports that the Arab oil-producing countries have postponed a meeting scheduled for tomorrow that would have discussed the possible end of the oil embargo against the U.S. and the Netherlands.

In Algiers, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Saudi Arabian King Faisal and Algerian President Houari Boumediene confer on the oil situation and on policy toward Israel.

Feb. 14—at the close of a meeting of 4 Arab leaders in Algiers, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy of

Egypt and Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia ask to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington to discuss the disengagement of troops on the Syrian front. Kissinger agrees to the request. An official statement by the 4 conferees reaffirms Arab demands for Israeli evacuation of Arab territories and a guarantee of Palestinian rights.

Feb. 16—The foreign ministers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia arrive in the U.S. for talks with U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger.

In Damascus, leaders of the Palestinian commandos gather to confer on the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state in Palestinian territories in anticipation of Israel's withdrawal.

Feb. 21—The final phase of Israeli withdrawal from the western bank of the Suez Canal ends. The next phase is to be Israeli withdrawal from the eastern bank of the canal to new lines just west of the Mitla and Gidi passes, to be completed by March 5.

Feb. 27—Kissinger flies from Damascus to Tel Aviv, taking a list of 65 Israeli prisoners of war held by Syria to Israeli Premier Golda Meir.

United Nations

(See also *Iran, Iraq*)

Feb. 15—At a U.N. Security Council meeting, Iraq accuses Iran of responsibility for recent border clashes because of Iran's expansionist aims in the Persian Gulf.

War in Indochina

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 2—Rebel forces shell the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh; they kill 15 civilians and wound 71.

Feb. 5—South Vietnamese and Vietcong negotiators agree to exchange over 4,000 civilian and military prisoners over a 3-week period beginning February 8.

Feb. 6—The pro-Communist Pathet Lao and the royal government of Laos sign an agreement to establish a joint police force of Pathet Lao and government militiamen to patrol Vientiane (the administrative capital) and Luang Prabang (the royal capital). This agreement settles the last major issue delaying the formation of a coalition government and the full implementation of the January, 1973, cease-fire agreement.

Feb. 8—The Saigon government releases 200 prisoners of war as the prisoner exchange resumes after a 6-month suspension.

Feb. 16—Rebel forces shell Phnom Penh. Nearly 200 people are reported to have been killed and at least twice that many wounded in the attack on February 11.

BANGLADESH

(See *Intl, Islamic Conference; Pakistan*)

BOLIVIA

Feb. 1—4,800 tin miners announce a 48-hour wildcat strike to protest food shortages and the economic policies of President Hugo Banzer Suárez's government.

BRAZIL

Feb. 21—President-elect General Ernesto Geisel announces the new members of his Cabinet, which takes office March 15.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

CANADA

Feb. 28—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau proposes a record \$22-billion budget for fiscal 1975.

CHILE

Feb. 7—*The New York Times* reports that, in a January 18 letter from the Christian Democratic party (Chile's largest party) to General Augusto Pinochet, president of the military junta, the party accused the junta of violating human rights and suppressing political activity.

CHINA

(See also *Vietnam*)

Feb. 4—*The New York Times* reports that a broadcast yesterday from Hunan Province announced that a new cultural revolution has begun on orders of Communist party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the Communist party.

Feb. 16—It is reported that all Chinese cities, except Peking, have been closed to foreigners during the "people's war," which began February 2, against "Lin Piao, Confucius and their like."

Feb. 21—President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia arrives for an 8-day visit.

COSTA RICA

Feb. 3—National elections are held.

Feb. 5—Daniel Oduber Quirós of the National Liberation party names a Cabinet. Incomplete returns indicate that he has received more than the 40 percent minimum necessary for election on the first ballot.

CUBA

Feb. 25—The first shipment of Argentine goods arrives, part of a \$1.2-billion trade agreement, the largest between Cuba and any Latin American country.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—President Anwar Sadat issues 2 decrees naming Mohammed Hassanain Heykal to the post of presidential press adviser; he is thus relieved of his posts as chief editor and chairman of the board of *Al Ahram*, the leading Egyptian newspaper.

Feb. 2—Close friends of Heykal's declare that he has refused the new position and will retire.

Feb. 8—*Al Ahram* reports that Sadat will continue as his own Premier until all Egyptian territory occupied by Israel has been returned to Egypt.

ETHIOPIA

Feb. 27—The Cabinet of Haile Selassie resigns under increasing pressure from military dissidents over demands for higher pay.

Feb. 28—Endalkatcheu Makonnen is named Premier, replacing Akilu Hable Wolde, who resigned yesterday. A new army commander and a new Minister of Defense are named. Troops receive a 2d pay rise in 1 week, but mutiny apparently continues.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Conference of Oil-Consuming Nations*)

Feb. 9—France and Iran announce the signing of a \$5-billion energy agreement. France will build 5 nuclear power plants in Iran and a pipeline for carrying natural gas to France. Iran and France will jointly construct a gas liquefaction plant and a fleet of gas tankers.

Feb. 16—Visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, on the 2d day of his visit, says that he is "satisfied" with his talks with French President Georges Pompidou.

Feb. 27—Premier Pierre Messmer and his Cabinet resign; Messmer is asked to form a new smaller Cabinet.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 13—The West German Cabinet agrees to an 11 percent wage increase for striking public service employees.

ICELAND

Feb. 23—A general strike to back wage demands begins by almost all the unions after they turn down an offer of a 12 percent wage increase.

INDIA

Feb. 9—The government of the western state of Gujarat collapses after weeks of rioting over food shortages. President V. V. Giri signs a proclamation establishing "President's rule" in Gujarat.

Feb. 18—India and the U.S. sign an agreement for

disposal of two-thirds of \$3-billion worth of rupees accumulated by the U.S. Some \$2.03 billion is granted to India for agricultural development and social welfare projects.

Feb. 24—Elections for the state assembly begin in the northern Indian province of Uttar Pradesh as well as in the southern territory of Pondicherry. The Uttar Pradesh vote is crucial to the Congress party because the province is the power base of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The second phase of the election will be held on Tuesday.

IRAN

(See *Intl, I.B.R.D., U.N.; France; Iraq*)

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Feb. 10—The Baghdad radio reports that a border clash with Iranian forces occurred tonight. Iranian forces reportedly continue to gather at the border area.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Feb. 20—Just before the expiration of a 3-week mandate to form a new government, Premier Golda Meir announces the formation of a minority coalition government composed of the Labor party, affiliated lists of Arab representatives, and the Independent Liberal party. The coalition will have 58 seats in the 120-seat Parliament.

Feb. 27—President Ephraim Katzir grants Premier Meir a 2d 7-day extension to complete the Cabinet.

ITALY

Feb. 27—Millions of workers stage a walkout to protest the soaring cost of living.

JORDAN

Feb. 7—King Hussein meets with officers and men at an army camp at Zerqa to answer questions about rising prices and low wages. Earlier this week, units of the elite 40th Brigade protested price increases.

Feb. 10—*The New York Times* reports that the U.S. is supplying sophisticated anti-tank missiles to the Jordanian army.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

Feb. 15—The South Korean Defense Ministry announces that North Korean gunboats have sunk a South Korean fishing boat and seized another in the Yellow Sea.

Feb. 16—The North Korean government charges that the South Korean boat sunk yesterday was a "spy ship."

LAOS(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)**LEBANON**

Feb. 23—Changes in top-level civil service posts are announced. Key positions in the civil service, long held by Christians, are reassigned to Muslims, upsetting a delicate political balance.

LIBYA(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Feb. 11—The Tripoli radio announces the complete nationalization of 3 U.S. oil companies by Libya to deal "a severe blow to American interests in the Arab world." Last September, 51 percent of these 3 companies was nationalized by the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi. The companies are Texaco, Inc.; a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California; and a subsidiary of the Atlantic-Richfield Company.

NIGERIA

Feb. 5—2 Nigerian universities are closed bringing to 4 the total closed after weekend rioting.

PANAMA

Feb. 7—In Panama City, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack sign an agreement on the principles that will shape negotiations over a new Panama Canal treaty. This agreement declares that the "concept of perpetuity will be eliminated," thus ending permanent U.S. sovereignty. Under the new treaty, the U.S. will operate the canal, but the territory in which the canal is located will be placed under the jurisdiction of Panama.

PAKISTAN

Feb. 23—Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announces the official recognition by Pakistan of Bangladesh, her former eastern territory.

PHILIPPINES, THE(See also *Vietnam*)

Feb. 5—The Philippine government claims the Spratly Islands, countering a claim by South Vietnam.

Feb. 15—The government reports that some 10,000 persons have been killed or are missing in fighting between Muslim rebels and government forces at Jolo in the Sulu Islands in the last 10 days. Approximately two-thirds of Jolo City is reportedly destroyed.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Feb. 4—Prime Minister John Vorster calls for general elections on April 24, 1974, a year earlier than is legally required.

Feb. 19—Vorster's government sends Parliament new legislation for more stringent suppression of organizations suspected of opposition to the government.

SPAIN

Feb. 12—Spanish Premier Carlos Arias Navarro announces that henceforth the majors and heads of provincial assemblies will be elected, not appointed. Holders of government jobs will be prohibited from serving in the Cortes (Parliament). In a speech, Arias promises that the government "will try to meet the requirements of Spanish society today." In December, 1973, Premier Luis Carrero Blanco was assassinated; today's measures are an attempt to dissipate unrest.

U.S.S.R.(See also *France; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 1—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will fly to the U.S. on February 3 from Cuba, where he is accompanying Soviet Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Feb. 13—The Soviet Union deports Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Nobel prize-winning author, to West Germany; a decree deprives Solzhenitsyn of Soviet citizenship.

Feb. 16—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin says that the Solzhenitsyn family may leave the Soviet Union to join Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

Feb. 18—Gromyko concludes a 3-day visit to France.

Feb. 21—The new U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., arrives in Moscow to fill a post that has been vacant for 13 months.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**

Feb. 4—The National Union of Mineworkers announces that 81 percent of its members have voted in favor of striking to support wage demands.

Feb. 7—Prime Minister Heath dissolves Parliament and calls a general election for February 28.

Feb. 8—Leaders of the coal miners reject an appeal by Heath to postpone their nationwide strike until after the election.

Feb. 10—British coal miners begin their strike.

Feb. 25—The government announces a January trade deficit of \$880 million, the worst in Britain's history. Exports lagged behind imports by \$60 million less than the previous record set in October, 1973.

Feb. 28—According to first returns, neither Heath's Conservative party nor Harold Wilson's Labour party appears to have won a working majority in today's general election for 635 seats in the House of Commons. The Liberals gain voting strength.

UNITED STATES

Economy

(See also *Labor*)

Feb. 1—The Cost of Living Council exempts from price and wage controls all retailers still restricted except those who sell food, motor vehicles and parts, and petroleum products.

In his annual Economic Message to Congress, accompanied by the report of his Council of Economic Advisers, President Richard M. Nixon forecasts that the economy will stagnate in the beginning of 1974, with improvement in the second half of the year. He predicts a continuing high rate of inflation, especially in the first half of the year.

Feb. 14—The Bankers Trust Company (the 7th largest U.S. bank) lowers its prime rate to 9 percent from the high of 10 percent charged in December, 1973.

Feb. 15—The Labor Department reports a sharp rise in wholesale prices and a decline in industrial production in January, 1974.

Feb. 22—The First National City Bank of New York announces its decision to lower its base lending rate to 8½ percent from 9 percent effective Monday. Other major banks quickly follow First National's move.

The Consumer Price Index jumped a full 1 percent in January, according to federal statistics. This is the second greatest monthly increase in the last quarter century. The January rise sends the index 9.4 percent above the January figure of last year—the largest 12-month increase in consumer prices since the Korean war in 1951.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Conference of Oil-Consuming Nations, Latin America, Middle East, War in Indochina; Jordan; Panama; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 2—A letter from President Nixon to President Lon Nol of Cambodia last week is released; President Nixon said that the U.S. will give the "maximum possible assistance" to Lon Nol's government.

Feb. 4—in Washington, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confers with President Nixon and U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Feb. 5—A communiqué is issued after 2 days of talks between Kissinger, Gromyko, and President Nixon; it declares that the Middle East peace negotiations must show progress. Kissinger and Gromyko, in a 1½-hour meeting at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, agree to resume the Geneva talks on strategic arms limitations on February 19.

Feb. 17—in Washington, Secretary of State Kissinger meets separately with the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers and a Syrian representative. Kissinger asserts that the principal point of these discussions is not the Arab oil embargo.

Feb. 18—The Egyptian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers present a 4-nation Arab proposal on disengagement along the Israeli-Syrian front.

Feb. 19—President Nixon meets with the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers; he announces that Kissinger will leave for the Middle East next week to try to open talks between Israel and Syria.

Feb. 26—The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council holds its first meeting in Washington.

Feb. 27—Henry Kissinger arrives in Damascus, Syria, for the start of talks on Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

The U.S. Navy reports that its demolition experts are assisting the Egyptians to clear mines and other explosives from the Suez Canal in preparation for its reopening this year.

Feb. 28—The U.S. and Egypt restore full diplomatic relations after a 7-year break.

Government

(See also *Labor*)

Feb. 1—Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), on behalf of the Democratic majority in Congress, responds on a national television broadcast to the President's State of the Union Message of January 30, 1974. He declares that the Democratic party will put the "regular business" of the U.S. first, but that the Congress and the courts must continue to investigate the Watergate scandal and "cleanse the political processes of the nation." He specifically rejects President Nixon's plea to end the Watergate investigations.

President Nixon signs a \$60-million, 3-year measure to establish a national center to cope with the problems of child abuse and child neglect.

Feb. 3—A "source" on the Senate Watergate committee (Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities) reports that it has been learned that Donald Nixon, the President's brother, was trailed by the Secret Service during the President's first term because of White House concern that Donald Nixon's business dealings might embarrass the President.

Feb. 4—in California, Judge Gordon Ringer of the Superior Court of the state orders President Nixon to appear and testify in behalf of 3 of his former aides being tried for the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

Judge Harvey M. Johnsen of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit rules that President Nixon did not have the authority to order a permanent end to construction of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal in 1971. Only Congress has the power to do so.

President Nixon sends Congress his proposed \$304.4-billion budget for fiscal 1975. The budget anticipates a deficit of \$9.4 billion.

Feb. 5—The office of the Special Prosecutor declares that it has received a letter from the White House concerning additional evidence requested by Watergate Special Prosecutor Jaworski. Sources report that the letter from White House counsel James D. St. Clair has informed Jaworski that the White House is refusing to yield the additional material. In his State of the Union Message on January 30, 1974, President Nixon declared that he had given Jaworski "all the material that he needs to conclude his investigations. . . ."

Governor Francis W. Sargent of Massachusetts announces a voluntary gasoline rationing plan. Director of the Federal Energy Office William E. Simon, addressing a Washington, D.C., audience, says that the states, not the federal government, should handle gas rationing. Thus far, Oregon, Hawaii, and New Jersey have introduced gas rationing.

A regional agency of the F.E.O. has ordered major oil companies to start round-the-clock deliveries to filling stations in New York and New Jersey until shortages are reduced.

In a January 30, 1974, letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, disclosed today, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has acknowledged that twice in 1971 he received secret State Department documents clandestinely; the documents were "retained" by a Navy clerk traveling with top national security advisers to the President.

Feb. 6—In a letter to Judge Gerhard A. Gesell of the U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., President Nixon defends his refusal to give 5 tapes to the Senate Watergate committee because the committee does not act secretly in the manner of a grand jury. If the tapes are disclosed publicly, the President maintains, the principle of presidential confidentiality will have been violated.

The House of Representatives votes, 410 to 4, to give its Judiciary Committee broad powers to investigate President Nixon's conduct and the possibility of impeachment. The committee is empowered to subpoena anyone, including the President.

Feb. 7—Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D., N.J.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, discloses that White House lawyers will meet with the committee to discuss President Nixon's cooperation with the committee's investigation.

In his 2d annual international economic report to Congress, President Nixon observes that the U.S. economy is no longer almost wholly self-sufficient; it shows "rising dependence on foreign resources."

Feb. 8—Judge Gerhard A. Gesell of the U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., rejects the Senate Watergate committee's appeal for 5 presidential tapes on the grounds that the public use of these

tapes by the committee may affect "pending criminal prosecutions" and that "pretrial publicity" may prejudice the rights of future defendants.

Feb. 9—In a radio address from the White House, President Nixon proposes a \$16-billion federal program to improve railways, subways and bus lines over the next 6 years. The President will also offer legislation to provide \$2 billion in federal loan guarantees for capital investment by railroad lines.

Feb. 12—Appearing unannounced at a ceremony at the Lincoln Memorial commemorating Abraham Lincoln's birthday, President Nixon declares that Lincoln, who was vilified during his presidency, had the courage "to stand firm no matter how harsh or unfair the criticism might be."

Feb. 14—The Federal Energy Office announces that it will send expert teams to 20 states facing serious gasoline problems (including New York and New Jersey); reallocation of fuel may result from their investigations. Deputy Federal Energy Administrator John C. Sawhill declares that gasoline rationing has been ruled out for the present; that major oil companies have been directed to make immediate allocations to relieve diesel fuel shortages; and that oil companies have been told to increase jet fuel production by 6 percent.

Special Prosecutor Jaworski, in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee released today, reports that President Nixon has refused to yield additional documents and tape recordings that Jaworski finds necessary to his investigation. Jaworski has promised the Judiciary Committee to notify it of non-cooperation by the White House.

The New York Times reports that congressional sources have disclosed that some \$200,000 in contributions for Republican congressional candidates from milk producers was diverted to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President in 1972; the diversion was reportedly an attempt to "launder" campaign gifts for the President from the milk producers.

Feb. 15—Some 200 gasoline station operators in the Norfolk, Virginia, area close; thousands more across the country threaten to close to protest federal gasoline allocations and pricing policies, as well as harassment by customers.

A statement by White House lawyer James D. St. Clair, interpreted by White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, discloses that President Nixon wants to avoid a confrontation with Jaworski over the President's refusal to yield more material. The President has instructed his lawyer to continue private talks with Jaworski.

Feb. 16—The Federal Energy Office authorizes a 1¢-per-gallon price increase for gasoline station operators whose fuel allocations have been reduced by 15 percent or more. The increase, effective

March 1, is ordered to halt protests and avert threatened shutdowns of gasoline stations. It will apply to about half of the 225,000 stations in the U.S. The increase is an addition to the end-of-the-month price rises allowed to offset cost fluctuations.

In the Norfolk, Virginia, area, and in North Carolina, some stations remain closed to protest the federal ban on preferential treatment for regular customers by station operators. Federal energy officials declare that stations may give preferential treatment to bulk or commercial customers if the arrangements to buy gasoline were made before January 15, 1974.

Feb. 17—President Nixon's lawyer, James D. St. Clair, denies a *Washington Post* story charging that 2 subpoenaed White House tapes were re-recorded. He says that his statement is based on a wholly independent White House-sponsored technical review of the tapes. The results of the review will be available to the 6-man panel appointed to investigate the tapes by Chief Judge John J. Sirica of the U.S. district court in Washington, D.C.

The Treasury Department announces that Secret Service protection for former Vice President Spiro T. Agnew has been terminated.

Feb. 18—In Alabama at an "Honor America Day" rally, President Nixon shares the platform with Governor George C. Wallace.

Feb. 19—Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans go on trial in federal district court in New York City on charges of obstructing justice.

The chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), announces that the committee will discontinue public hearings; it will continue the investigation in closed session and prepare a final report.

Simon orders emergency allocations of 84 million gallons of gasoline for 20 states. The extra gasoline will come from oil company inventories.

The Senate approves a compromise emergency energy bill that includes a provision for rolling back the price of domestic crude oil. The bill, which now goes to the House, also gives the President emergency powers to deal with the energy crisis. President Nixon has said that he will veto the bill because of the inflexibility of the price rollback provision.

Feb. 20—in a special message to Congress, President Nixon asks for an extension of economic stabilization powers in the health-care field so that price controls remain after the April 30 expiration date.

Feb. 21—The bipartisan staff of lawyers of the House Judiciary Committee advises committee members that impeachment is a remedy against "constitutional wrongs that subvert the structure of govern-

ment, or undermine the integrity of office and even the Constitution itself."

Feb. 25—Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal lawyer and one of his chief fund raisers, pleads guilty to 2 charges in the Watergate-related investigations. The allegations are that he helped run an illegal congressional campaign in 1970 and that he received a \$100,000 campaign contribution in exchange for a European ambassadorial assignment.

President Nixon declares in his first White House news conference in four months that "I do not expect to be impeached." He differs with the House Judiciary Committee report on impeachment saying that the constitution is "very precise" in requiring proof of criminal misconduct before impeachment.

The Watergate prosecutors begin an investigation into President Nixon's role in the handling of military snooping on the White House in 1971.

Feb. 26—President Nixon refuses to appear at a hearing in Washington, D.C., to determine whether he must testify at the trial of John D. Ehrlichman in California. He also refuses to testify at the trial.

Feb. 27—The House of Representatives votes 258 to 151 to pass the compromise energy bill; it goes to the President.

U.S. District Judge J. Robert Elliott releases Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., on \$1,000-personal bond; Calley has been detained under house arrest for his role in the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam in 1968.

Labor

Feb. 1—*The New York Times* reports that fuel protests staged by independent truckers are seriously disrupting deliveries of fruit, produce, meat, and steel. George Ryan, president of the Council of Independent Truckers, one of the major groups involved in the protest, declares that the protest is "extremely effective" in 28 states.

Feb. 4—The independent truckers' work stoppage enters its 5th day. Food deliveries are interrupted. The Nixon administration proposes that Congress approve a joint resolution to speed financial relief to the truckers, who want diesel fuel prices reduced. Violence is reported in a number of states. Lay-offs and plant closings are ordered because of the lack of supplies.

Feb. 5—President Nixon orders a 1-month freeze on diesel fuel prices to help end the strike by independent truckers.

Feb. 7—Negotiators for the independent truckers reach agreement with the government on ending the truck strike. Among concessions granted to the truckers is a 6 percent surcharge on freight rates.

Feb. 11—*The New York Times* reports that most in-

dependent truckers have returned to work, ending 11 days of violence during which 2 drivers were left dead and many were injured.

Political Terrorism

Feb. 18—Randolph A. Hearst, editor and president of the *San Francisco Examiner*, announces the beginning of a \$2-million free food program for California's poor in response to the demands of the Symbionese Liberation Army in the hopes of opening talks on the release of his daughter, Patricia, kidnapped February 4 by the SLA.

Feb. 22—In response to the SLA demands for a greatly expanded food program, the Hearst family announces that the matter is now in the hands of the Hearst Corporation. The corporation offers a counterproposal: a \$4-million food program to begin after Patricia's release.

Politics

Feb. 18—In a race for the House seat vacated by Vice President Gerald Ford in the 5th Congressional District in Michigan, Richard F. VanderVeen, the Democratic candidate, is elected over his Republican opponent. The first Democrat to win in that district in 64 years, VanderVeen urged the impeachment of the President.

Science and Space

Feb. 8—Skylab 3 astronauts successfully end their 84-day mission in orbit around the earth with a splashdown in the Pacific Ocean. They set a record for the longest manned space flight.

Supreme Court

Feb. 20—The Supreme Court unanimously rules that a landlord being sued by a person to whom he has refused to rent has a right to a jury trial to determine if he is guilty of racial discrimination.

UPPER VOLTA

Feb. 8—The army seizes power. President Sangoulé Lamizana, in a radio broadcast announcing the coup d'état, declares that the National Assembly has been dissolved and the constitution has been suspended.

Feb. 11—President Lamizana names a Cabinet.

URUGUAY

Feb. 24—*The New York Times* reports that Juan Carlos Onetti, considered to be Uruguay's leading novelist and one of the best in Latin America, has been held under arrest for almost two weeks. He was arrested for acting as a judge in a literary jury that awarded first prize to a short story later deemed obscene and subversive by the right-wing, military-controlled government. His detainment is seen as part of a crackdown by anti-leftists on the academic and literary community.

VATICAN, THE

Feb. 5—Pope Paul VI orders the formal retirement of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary.

VENEZUELA

Feb. 13—President-elect Carlos Andres Pérez states that foreign oil company holdings in Venezuela will be nationalized within 2 years after his government takes office next month.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina; Philippines*)

Feb. 5—A Foreign Ministry statement, replying to a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement that China will not tolerate South Vietnam's presence on the Spratly Islands, reaffirms South Vietnam's claim to the islands.

Feb. 16—All but 2 members of the Cabinet resign at the request of President Nguyen Van Thieu. Premier Tran Thien Khiem is asked to form a new government.

Feb. 18—A new Cabinet is announced.

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 21—A new socialist constitution is adopted; this is Yugoslavia's fourth since World War II.

ZAMBIA

(See *China*)

NATIVE MINORITIES

(Continued from page 183)


the more general political realities in the North, Usher has observed.

The real struggle for the North is not between southern developers and southern ecologists, but between native northerners and the federal government for control of the land. The federal government can be counted on to act on behalf of southern developers. . . .

The best way for progressive southern Canadians to help native northerners is to stop thinking of the North as the common property and future hope of all Canadians. The real northern vision is that which native northerners themselves have for their own land and society. That is the vision which is being violated today.¹⁶

Thus the aboriginal rights struggle in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada cannot be fully analyzed by using an ethnic conflict model. More accurately, the conflict may be recast as a struggle between a heretofore powerless minority—the native people—and the provincial and federal governments of Canada.

¹⁶ Peter J. Usher, "Who Owns the North?" *Canadian Dimension*, vol. 9, no. 8, p. 76. His remarks were occasioned by a review of James Woodford, *The Violated Vision—The Rape of Canada's North* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972).



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